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 1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
The potential economic importance of buyouts and venture capital has attracted much 
both public and academic interest during the recent decades. As a consequence, also the 
amount of literature discussing impact of private equity and venture capital investing is 
extensive. Several studies have shown that venture capital and buyout investment have a 
positive effect on firm performance and the overall economy (see e.g. Strömberg 
(2009)). Regarding the impact of private equity in the Finnish context, studies of 
Männistö (2009) and  Alén (2012) have found similar positive relationships between 
private equity funding and firm-level performance. This study builds on the earlier 
studies on the Finnish private equity industry, and by combining fine-grained interview 
data with secondary data sources, deepens the understanding of private equity in 
Finland. 
Although there is clear evidence that private equity and venture capital investors 
contribute to the performance of their portfolio companies and further to the growth of 
the overall economy, it is not fully understood what are the key mechanisms behind this 
phenomenon. It is presented that value-adding activities include, for example, strategic 
and operational advice, monitoring and involvement in decision-making (see e.g. 
MacMillan et al. (1989), Gorman & Sahlman (1989), Sapienza (1992), Sapienza et al. 
(1996)). Furthermore, private equity investors differ in terms of their value-adding 
capabilities. For example, previous studies have found that private equity experience 
(Kaplan & Schoar 2005), prior business experience (Bottazzi et al. 2008) and investor 
networks (Hochberg et al. 2007) are associated with higher portfolio company 
performance. However, it is still rather unclear which mechanisms are value-adding in 
which investor-company configurations. 
Moreover, in the public discussion there are several prejudices about both private equity 
and venture capital investing. For example, buyout investments are often associated 
with extensive cost savings programs and layoffs. Besides building on the prior studies 
on the Finnish private equity industry, the aim of this study is to provide improved and 
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deeper understanding of private equity investing not only for academics and 
practitioners but also for the general public. Increased information about the topic will 
further dispel prejudices and potential misconceptions about the industry. 
1.2. Research objectives and questions 
Earlier studies have shown that Finnish PE funded companies outperform their non-PE 
funded peers (see e.g. Alén (2012), Männistö (2009)). However, it is not fully 
understood to what extent active involvement of the private equity investor contributes 
to this superior performance. Hence, the aim of this thesis is to explore mechanisms 
through which private equity investors can improve performance of their Finnish 
portfolio companies. The research question is as follows: 
How do private equity investors contribute to the performance of their Finnish portfolio 
companies? 
In order to answer this question, one has to understand what are the value-adding 
mechanisms of private equity, how investors have used these mechanisms in the Finnish 
context and when the involvement of private equity investor has positively affected the 
performance of the portfolio company. In addition, earlier academic studies have 
discussed how macroeconomic factors and industry characteristics drive fund-level 
performance (see e.g. Guo et al. (2011)). Moreover, earlier studies indicate that also 
investor-specific factors, such as earlier experience of the investor, affect fund-level 
performance (see e.g. Acharya et al. 2013). Although these findings are related to fund-
level rather than firm-level performance, it is reasonable to examine whether market 
characteristics and investor experience affect value added by private equity investors. In 
conclusion, the main question can be divided into four sub-questions: 
1) What are the value-adding mechanisms through which private equity investors 
contribute to the performance of their portfolio companies? 
2) How have private equity investors used these mechanisms in order to contribute 
to the operational performance of their Finnish portfolio companies? 
3) How do investor characteristics affect value added by private equity? 
4) What is the role of industry characteristics on value added by private equity? 
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In order to answer these questions, this study has three primary objectives: 
1) To review the existing academic literature about value-adding mechanisms of 
private equity 
2) By studying the sample of case companies, to explore what mechanisms private 
equity investors have used in order to improve the operational performance of 
their Finnish portfolio companies 
3) To provide a comprehensive overview that explains which mechanisms have 
been value-adding in various investor-company configurations 
The purpose of the first objective is to provide relevant theoretical categories that can be 
utilized in case selection and later in the analysis and theory-building phases (see 
Chapter 1.3.). In other words, the first objective is essential in achieving the other two 
objectives. In addition, the successful fulfilment of the second objective is a pre-
requisite for achieving the third objective. 
1.3. Research design, methods and scope 
This thesis is conducted as a case study. The research process can be divided into six 
distinct, yet interconnected phases as illustrated in Figure 1. First, academic literature is 
used for developing an initial theoretical framework. Findings of the literature review 
further guide the case selection process, interviews and the study in general.  
After the literature review, cases are selected so that they fill relevant conceptual 
categories. In other words, case selection follows theoretical, rather than random 
sampling. (Eisenhardt 1989) As discussed in Chapter 1.2, earlier academic studies have 
examined how industry and investor-specific characteristics drive fund performance. 
Hence, it is justified to choose cases from different industries and with different types of 
investors in order to explore whether these types of factors affect the use of value-
adding mechanisms.  
Furthermore, cases are selected so that the sample includes both exceptionally well-
performed companies as well as companies whose performance after the investment has 
been either moderate or even negative. By examining both successful companies and 
their peers, it is ensured that the study reveals not only what successful case companies 
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have in common but also how successful companies differ from their peers in terms of 
investor contribution 
The third and fourth phases of the study, data collection and analysis, are conducted in 
parallel. This approach ensures that initial findings are taken into account also in data 
collection phase (Eisenhardt 1989). The final phase is to develop a relevant and 
meaningful theoretical framework, which summarises the findings of the study. In this 
phase, cross-case analysis is complemented with fuzzy-set qualitative comparative 
analysis, which reveals how different investor-environment-company configurations 
can lead to positive outcome. As can be seen in Figure 1, analysed data is constantly 
compared with the findings of the literature review. In other words, the process is 
iterative in nature. 
Figure 1. Research process. 
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1.3.1. Unit of analysis and scope 
In this study, units of analysis are Finnish companies that have received private equity 
funding. Both venture capital and buyout investments are in the scope of this study. The 
private equity firm from which the case company has received funding can be 
headquartered either in Finland or abroad. However, to ensure the availability of the 
data, cases are selected so that the investor is a member of the Finnish Venture Capital 
Association.  
Case companies can operate in any industry. However, the sample is selected so that it 
includes companies, for example, from both growing and more mature industries. 
Similarly, the sample includes both highly successful companies in terms of sales 
growth and companies that have not been able to improve their performance 
significantly after receiving private equity funding. 
Regarding the time frame of the study, suitable case companies have received private 
equity funding during 2007-2011. Companies that have received funding earlier are not 
in the scope of this study as they have operated in a significantly different 
macroeconomic environment than companies that have received funding just before or 
during the financial crisis of 2008. Hence, conducting a cross-case analysis of two case 
companies that have received funding, for example, in 2002 and 2008, respectively, 
would not be relevant. On the other hand, it is hard to assess the post-deal performance 
of companies that have received funding after 2011 i.e. less than three fiscal years ago.   
Furthermore, this study focuses on mechanisms that private equity investors use in 
order to improve the performance of their portfolio companies. Topics such as the 
impact of private equity and value-drivers of private equity investments are discussed 
briefly in the literature review and taken into account in the case selection phase. 
However, these topics are not the primary focus of this study. Finally, the study focuses 
on value-adding mechanisms that affect the firm-level, operational performance. Hence, 
excluding the analysis of relevant findings of the earlier academic research, fund- and 
investment-level performance measures such as internal rate of return are not in the 
scope of this study. 
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1.3.2. Data sources 
Regarding the case selection phase, the main data sources include archival data 
collected in the prior study of Alén (2012), various listings of growth companies such as 
Deloitte Technology Fast 50 and discussions with industry experts.  
In the data collection phase, the primary data sources are interviews with investors and 
managers of case companies. This data is supported by and combined with secondary 
sources such as investment round data from SDC VentureXpert, information on prior 
work experience of investment managers from Linkedin and additional, complementary 
event data from press releases and board reports.  
1.4. Definitions of key terms 
Private equity 
EVCA (2007) defines private equity as “the provision of equity capital by financial 
investors – over the medium or long term – to non-quoted companies with high growth 
potential”. Private equity is hence the main category for all equity capital investments 
that are made in non-stock listed companies, and it can be further divided into two main 
sub-categories, namely buyouts and venture capital. 
Buyout 
Buyout is a type of private equity investment in which a PE investor acquires a 
controlling stake of a company, often together with the existing management team 
(management buyout, MBO) or with an outside management team (management buy-in, 
MBI). Typically, invested companies are fairly established, and investments are 
financed partly by debt. If debt accounts for a substantial share of the total investment 
sum, the investment is called a leveraged buyout (LBO). (EVCA 2007) 
Venture capital 
EVCA (2007) defines venture capital as “equity investments made for the launch, early 
development, or expansion of a business. It has a particular emphasis on 
entrepreneurial undertakings rather than on mature businesses”. In other words, 
venture capital investments differ from buyouts primarily in terms of investment stage.  
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PE investor, PE company and PE fund 
This thesis focuses on value-adding activities and resources provided by one or several 
investment professionals, and hence it is important distinguish an individual investment 
professional or a group of investment professionals from a private equity company as a 
whole. Hence, companies that manage private equity funds (PE fund) are called as PE 
companies while investment professionals who work in PE companies are called in this 
thesis as PE investors. These definitions include both buyout and venture capital 
investors and companies. Differentiation between buyouts and venture capital is made 
when appropriate (buyout investor/company vs. VC investor/company). Also terms 
‘investment partner’, ‘investment manager’ and ‘investment professional’ may be used 
to refer to an individual PE investor. 
Sometimes in the academic literature, the term ‘venture capitalist’ (the VC) is used to 
refer to all those parties that make private equity investments, including also buyout 
investors. However, for the sake of clarity, this thesis does not use the term ‘venture 
capitalist’ and the prefix ‘VC’ refers only to venture capital investments, investors or 
companies. 
Portfolio company 
Portfolio company, called also a target company, is a company that has received either 
equity or mezzanine funding from and is at that time funded by a private equity 
company. 
Entry 
Entry means the first private equity investment of the PE fund in the portfolio company. 
Especially in venture capital, portfolio companies typically receive funding during 
multiple financing rounds. In this thesis, also the term ‘initial investment’ is used to 
refer to the entry. 
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Exit 
In exit, the PE company divests its ownership in the portfolio company. Typical forms 
of exit are trade sale i.e. sale to an industrial buyer, sale to another PE company and 
initial public offering (IPO) (EVCA 2007). 
1.5. Structure of the thesis 
This study is organised as follows. In Chapter 2, I summarise the key findings of the 
existing academic literature discussing the value-adding mechanisms of private equity. 
Chapter 3 presents a more detailed research methodology and main data sources. 
Chapter 4 presents the results of the study while Chapter 5 discusses what are the 
implications of these results. Furthermore, Chapter 5 assesses the validity and reliability 
of the study and provides some directions for the future research. 
2. Literature review 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarise the key findings of the existing academic 
studies on the value-adding mechanisms of private equity. The findings of the literature 
review provide guidelines for the rest of the study. By analysing the results of the 
existing research, this chapter identifies research gaps based on which relevant research 
questions and research design are developed. In addition, the literature review discusses 
relevant theoretical categories that are utilised in the case selection and analysis phases. 
This literature review follows the approach used by Männistö (2009 ) and Alén (2012) 
i.e. utilises the categorization of Alemany & Martí (2005) who divide the research on 
private equity into two main streams, namely studies on the impact of private equity and 
studies on the value added by PE investors. The first stream of research focuses on the 
question whether PE investors are able to contribute to the success of their investments 
and further to the growth of the economy. More specifically, research on the impact of 
private equity tries to measure the potential economic and societal impact of private 
equity investing. 
This study focuses on the latter mentioned line of research, which examines how PE 
investors contribute to the success of their investments. During the recent years, the 
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focus of research on the value added by PE investors has shifted from non-financial 
services, often referred as value-adding services, provided by PE investors to more 
complex value-adding mechanisms. The key question of this research stream is whether 
some PE investors have distinctive skills and/or qualities that allow them to (i) choose 
best investment targets and invest in the most potential companies and/or (ii) provide 
better value-adding services to their portfolio companies. 
The literature review is divided into four sections.  The first subchapter provides a brief 
overview of private equity and discusses some key characteristics of the Finnish private 
equity industry. The key themes of the existing research on private equity are presented 
in chapters 2.2. and 2.3. Finally, findings of the literature review are summarised and 
research questions identified. 
2.1. What is private equity? 
As defined in Chapter 1, private equity means investing mainly equity capital in non-
publicly listed companies that have potential for good future performance. Investments 
are usually realised i.e. exited after 3-7 years after the first investment. In other words, 
the private equity investor is a medium-term owner of the company.  (FVCA 2010) The 
typical structure of a private equity fund is illustrated in Figure 2. The system has four 
key phases, namely fundraising, target selection, investment period and exit. 
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Figure 2. Private equity business model. (EVCA 2007) 
 
In the fundraising phase, a PE company i.e. the general partner invites institutional and 
individual investors i.e. limited partners to invest in the private equity investment fund. 
Limited partners provide the fund with capital and in exchange, become shareholders of 
the investment fund. At this stage, also the fund’s life span and investment strategy, for 
example in terms of growth stages and industries, are defined. After the fundraising, 
fund managers start to seek and invest in appropriate portfolio companies according to 
the pre-defined investment focus. (EVCA 2007) It should also be noted that the 
responsibility of the general partner is to manage the portfolio on behalf of limited 
partners, and hence limited partners pay a fixed annual compensation called 
management fee for the PE company. Thus, cash flows of the private equity company 
consist of the fixed management fee and share of the possible fund returns. (FVCA 
2010) 
In order to increase the value of their investments during the fairly limited investment 
time frame, private equity investors not only provide funding but also exercise different 
forms of active ownership. Typically, PE investors are actively involved in the 
monitoring of the financial performance of their portfolio companies (e.g. Gorman & 
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Sahlman 1989; Jensen 1989). PE investors can also participate in the strategic planning 
and decision-making (e.g. Sapienza et al. 1996) in order to promote growth and 
entrepreneurial behaviour in their portfolio companies (e.g. Wright et al. 2000; Wright 
et al. 2001; Bruining & Wright 2002; Bruining et al. 2013). Considering especially 
young ventures, private equity investors can add value by helping the company to 
systematize its internal processes and professionalize the organization (Hellmann & 
Puri 2002). These types of non-financial services and their potential impact on the 
company performance are at the core of this thesis. 
In the exit phase, the private equity fund generates returns by selling the ownership of 
the company, for example, to trade buyer or another investor. Another common exit 
route is to take the company public through an initial public offering (IPO).  (FVCA 
2010) At this point, capital gained in the exit is returned to limited partners –original 
shareholders of the fund.  When all the committed capital has been invested and some 
investments have been realised, the private equity company can start collecting its next 
fund. Naturally, the popularity – and further the size of the following fund depend on 
the successfulness of previous funds. (EVCA 2007) 
Considering the society as a whole, private equity investing has various effects. The 
growth of portfolio companies has been proved to have a positive effect for example on 
employment (Engel & Keilbach 2007), corporate tax payments (Alemany & Martí 
2005), and innovation and the creation of new firms (Samila & Sorenson 2010). In 
addition, as pension funds are significant shareholders in private equity funds (EVCA 
2013), profits of the private equity fund affect pension revenues and hence, the private 
equity sector can be also considered to have an effect on the wealth of individual 
citizens.  
2.2. Private equity in Finland 
The Finnish private equity industry was born in late 1980s when the first Finnish private 
equity companies were established (Erola 2014). In 1990, Finnish Venture Capital 
Association (FVCA), whose objective is to increase awareness of the private equity 
sector, was founded with 17 founding members (FVCA 2010).  Currently, the 
association has 48 full members (FVCA 2014b). This increase in the number of 
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members in FVCA reflects the significant growth of the industry during the last quarter 
century.   
The growth of the industry can also be seen in Figure 3 as both the number and total 
amount of investments have grown significantly since 1996. However, the Finnish 
private equity sector, among other industries, has not been immune to global, macro-
economic events. As can be seen in the number of VC investments, the burst of the dot-
com bubble affected also the Finnish PE industry in early 2000s.  Also the global 
financial crisis increased uncertainty in the Finnish PE market and decreased investment 
activity during 2008-2009. Investment activity has stably recovered from 2010 onwards, 
reaching a good level 2013, albeit far from the record year of 2007. Based on H1/2014 
figures, both the value and number of buyout and venture capital investments can be 
expected to be approximately at the same level in 2014 than in 2013.  
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Figure 3. The number and amount of private equity investments made by Finnish PE 
companies during 1996-H1/2014. (FVCA 2010; FVCA 2011; FVCA 2014c) 
 
Despite the growth of the industry, the Finnish private equity sector still accounts for 
only a small fraction of the global supply of private equity funding. For example in 
Q1/2014, Finnish PE companies invested approximately 116 millions euros (FVCA 
2014a) while the equivalent number for the members of the US-based National Venture 
Capital was 9,5 billion dollars (NVCA 2014). Considering private equity investments as 
a percentage of the GDP, in 2013 Finland placed fifth among European countries after 
the UK, Denmark, Sweden and France (EVCA 2013). 
Figure 3 also shows a typical pattern in the Finnish private equity industry; VC 
investments dominate in terms of number of investments but buyout investments form a 
larger share of the total amount invested. The large number of VC investments is due to 
the fact that VC funds tend to stage and syndicate their investments. On the other hand, 
buyout funds focus on larger companies than VC funds, and hence buyout investments 
exceed VC investments in terms of investment amount. Another notable pattern in the 
Finnish private equity industry is tendency of PE investors to invest most of their funds 
in domestic companies. This applies to both VC and buyout investments (FVCA 2011).  
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Despite Finnish PE funds’ strong emphasis on the Finnish companies, foreign 
investments are an important source of private equity funding for Finnish companies 
(FVCA 2011). For example during 2013-H1/2014, foreign investors accounted for 34% 
of VC and 36% of buyout investments in Finnish companies in terms of investment 
amount (FVCA 2013; FVCA 2014c). Hence, an ability to attract international capital 
into Finland can be considered one of the key aspects of the Finnish PE sector.  
According to Nordic Growth Entrepreneurship Review 2012, venture capital 
investments in Finland, like in other Nordic countries too, are mostly focused on early-
stage cases (i.e. seed or start-up), which means that companies that are in expansion 
stage may face difficulties when seeking VC financing. The review argues that this 
phenomenon is not only a supply-side problem but also reflects the lack of capable 
entrepreneurs who are able to scale up young ventures. (Nordic Innovation 2013) 
However, recent statistics of FVCA show that considering VC investments, share of 
later stage venture investments has steadily increased since 2012. In H1/2014, later 
stage venture investments accounted for 24% of all VC investments in Finnish 
companies while the equivalent number in 2012 was only 18% (FVCA 2014c). 
Reflecting the relatively young age of the industry, the amount of research on the 
Finnish PE sector is still somewhat limited. Earlier research on the topic include studies 
of Lähdemäki (2007), Männistö (2009) and Alén (2012). These three studies focus on 
the impact of private equity, and hence they differ mainly in terms of methodology. 
Lähdemäki (2007) compares performances of portfolio companies of one Finnish PE 
company to industry averages. Männistö (2009) examines whether post-investment 
performance of companies that received PE funding from the members of the Finnish 
Venture Capital Association during 2002-2004 differs from that of the control group. 
Also Alén (2012) studies post-investment performance differences between PE backed 
companies and their mathced peers. However, study of Alén (2012) adopts a wider time 
horizon from 2002 to 2008. In addition, in order to overcome potential biases due to 
selection effects (i.e. PE investors invest in companies with higher growth potential), 
Alén (2012) uses a balancing score mathing methodology in the construction of the 
control group. Hence in the methodological sense, study of Alén (2012) can be 
considered the most sophisticated of these three studies. 
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In conclusion, studies of Lähdemäki (2007), Männistö (2009) and Alén (2012) represent 
a continuum in the research on the Finnish private equity industry. Findings of these 
three studies will be discussed in more detail during the next chapters. In general, 
results imply that in Finland, private equity investing has a positive effect on firm 
performance.  These positive results provide interesting questions for further research 
on the Finnish PE sector and highlight the need for more fine-grained analysis. 
2.3. Research on impact of private equity 
Research on impact of private equity studies relationships between private equity 
investments and changes either in the firm-level performance or in the growth of the 
overall economy.  Typical measures of the firm-level performance include operational 
indicators such as revenue and the number of employees as well as other measures 
including innovativeness and internationalisation. Impact on the economy is evaluated 
by studying, for example, changes in the employment, aggregate income and the 
number of new start-ups.  
Although the main focus of this study is on the value-adding mechanisms of private 
equity, research on impact of private equity is an important topic to be discussed for two 
key reasons. First, studies that indicate that the impact of private equity on the firm-
level performance and the overall economy is positive indicate that private equity 
investors either choose the most potential companies, or offer some value-adding 
services that improve company performance. Second, impact of private equity seems to 
differ, for example, between geographical regions, which implies that PE investors 
differ in terms of ability to create value in their portfolio companies. This finding 
creates a need for a deeper analysis of the value-adding mechanisms of private equity.   
2.3.1. Operating performance 
Earliest studies discussing the performance impact of private equity typically focus on 
pre- and post-deal performance of buyout investments in the United States during the 
late 1980s. For example, by studying performance of companies that had been targets 
for large-scale MBOs during 1980-1986, Kaplan (1989) shows that MBOs have a clear 
positive effect on net cash flow, operating income and expenditure. Also the studies of 
Bull (1989) and Singh (1990) compare the pre- and post-deal performance of buyout 
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companies. Their results indicate that buyouts are associated with higher sales growth 
and better than industry-average or improved profitability.  
A more recent study on operational gains of buyouts is from Guo et al. (2011) who 
study returns and changes in operating performance of public to private transactions in 
the United States during 1990-2006  and compare the results to earlier findings from the 
first buyout wave from 1980s. Guo et al. (2011) show that the studied sample achieved 
smaller gains in operating performance than those reported during the LBO boom in 
1980s. However, researchers also note that the variation in operational performance 
within the sample is significant, which implies that operating performance may 
differentiate cases with high returns from their less successful peers.  
Results from Europe are somewhat more diverse.  Wright et al. (1992) analyse LBOs in 
the UK during 1980s and present that buyouts have a positive effect both on 
profitability and working capital management. The more recent study of Weir et al. 
(2008) provide to a some degree support for the results of Wright et al. (1992) . Weir et 
al. (2008) examine public-to-private transactions in the UK during 1998-2004 and argue 
that companies that are backed by a private equity company, experience higher 
efficiency, measured as lower expenses, and increased liquidity. However, authors find 
no evidence for improved overall profitability, which they explain by the fact that PE 
companies invested in large companies, which had the poorest initial profitability in the 
sample. 
On the other hand, studies from France and Belgium provide less encouraging results. 
The research on Belgian buyouts shows that there is no relationship between PE backed 
buyouts and higher sales growth (Goossens et al. 2006). In addition, Desbrières & 
Schatt (2002) find that that, for example, profitability and return on equity of French 
buyout companies decrease after the investment compared to the industry average. 
However, they note that these conflicting results may be due to the special 
characteristics of the French buyout market, such as relatively low debt levels of buyout 
target companies. By referring to the popular article of (Jensen 1989), Desbrières & 
Schatt (2002) analyse that due to indebtedness, managers of French buyout backed 
companies have less pressure to perform well than their colleagues in more heavily 
leveraged, buyout backed firms.  
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Considering venture capital investments, involvement of the private equity investor has 
in general been considered to have a positive effect on growth and productivity. For 
example, evidence from Spain indicates that there is a positive relationship between 
firm-level performance and VC funding. By examining Spanish companies that have 
received VC funding during 1989-1998, Alemany & Martí (2005) argue that VC 
funding has a significant positive effect, for example, on sales and profitability.  
Besides sales growth, VC funding has been shown to accelerate productivity. Study of 
Croce et al. (2013) examines a sample of relatively young companies (i.e. less than 20 
years old in 2010) in six European countries. Croce et al. (2013) show that before the 
VC investment, there are no notable differences in productivity growth between VC 
backed and non-VC backed companies, but after the VC investment, the productivity 
growth of VC backed companies is significantly higher than that of the matched control 
group.  
In Finland, research on the performance impact of private equity include studies of 
Lähdemäki (2007), Männistö (2009) and Alén (2012). Lähdemäki (2007) finds that 
studied PE backed companies experiences a significant 12 %-point higher sales growth 
than the industry average. Also results of Männistö (2009) and Alén (2012) support the 
argument that Finnish PE companies accelerate growth of their portfolio companies as 
both studies report that PE backed companies grow significantly faster than their 
matched control groups. Alén (2012) finds that annual sales growth of PE backed 
companies is 9 %-points higher than that of their matched peers. Results of Männistö 
(2009) suggest that, in absolute terms, PE backed companies achieve significantly 
higher sales growth (€4.65m vs. €1.26m) three years after the initial investment than the 
control group.  
One explanation for these highly positive results from Finland is that Finnish PE backed 
companies are typically smaller than their foreign peers. For example in H1/2014, the 
average VC investment in Finland was 260,000 euros and average buyout investment 
4.1 million euros (FVCA 2014c). In contrast, for example in the UK, average VC 
investment is reported to be around 1 million euros and average buyout investments 
greater than 30 million euros (BVCA 2013). In smaller companies, value is more likely 
created through fast growth than increased efficiency. Hence, in the Finnish context, PE 
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investors seem to have an important role as growth promoters of small and mid-sized 
companies. 
2.3.2.  Employees 
Based on the existing academic research, impact of private equity on employment 
seems to differ between buyout and venture capital investments. In general, VC 
investments have been found to accelerate employment growth while results 
considering buyouts are somewhat more diverse. For example, Davis et al. (2011) 
shows that buyouts both decrease employment and create new jobs. However, these 
differing results between VC and buyouts are sensible. In small VC backed companies, 
growth probably leads to increase in headcount. In contrast, growth of more mature 
buyout backed companies may require reallocation of certain jobs rather than just hiring 
of new employees. 
Engel (2002) studies the effect of VC investment on the employment growth of young 
German companies. He finds that VC backed companies experience approximately 170 
%-points higher employment growth than their non-VC backed peers. In contrast, Engel 
shows that the effect of other external investors on employment growth is 
approximately 50 %-points, which is clearly lower than the effect of VC funding. Hence 
in the German context, VC backing seems to have a positive effect on employment 
growth and VC funding is a stronger driver of employment growth than involvement of 
other types of investors.  
Results of Engel & Keilbach (2007) provide support for the findings of Engel (2002). 
By comparing German VC backed companies with their matched non-VC backed peers, 
Engel & Keilbach (2007) show that in terms of employment growth VC backed 
companies grow faster than their counterparts. According to Engel & Keilbach (2007), 
the effect of VC funding on employment growth vary across industries, business related 
services representing the strongest effect. 
Achleitner & Klöckner (2005) study changes in employment in both buyout- and VC 
backed at a Pan-European level. By combining survey data with secondary data sources 
of the European Venture Capital Association, Achleitner & Klöckner present that in 
2004 European buyout backed and VC backed companies employed almost 5 million 
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and 1 million people, respectively. Authors argue that during 2000-2004 employment in 
European PE backed companies grew approximately 5.4% p.a., which means that PE 
backed companies created approximately 1 million new jobs during the studied time 
period. Achleitner & Klöckner also highlight that buyout and venture capital investors 
have somehat different roles in promoting employment: while 83% of people working 
in PE backed companies work in buyout backed companies, majority of new jobs, 
630,000 out of 1 million, were created in VC backed companies. 
Considering impact of buyouts on employment growth, academic studies provide a few 
different viewpoints. For example, Amess & Wright (2007) study a sample of 5396 UK 
companies during 1999-2004 and find that although in general LBOs experience a 
sligthly higher employment growth than non-LBOs, this effect is not statistically 
significant. However, authors note that MBOs and MBIs have a different effect on 
employment growth: employment growth is higher for MBOs and lower for MBIs than 
for their industry peers.  
Davis et al. (2011) study US buyouts during 1980-2005 and propose that buyout 
companies “catalyze the creative destruction process in the labor market”. This means 
that although employment decreases in buyout companies, these companies also create 
new jobs at a faster pace than the control group. As a consequence, according to Davis 
et al. (2011) , the net effect of buyouts on company employment is less than -1%. These 
findings provide support for the proposition that buyouts increase efficiency, in this case 
by reallocating jobs in the portfolio company. 
In the Finnish context, private equity has been found to have a highly positive effect on 
portfolio company employment. Lähdemäki (2007) presents that employment growth is 
55 %-points higher in PE backed companies than the industry average. Findings of 
Männistö (2009) are equally, if not even more positive as he suggests that in absolute 
terms, PE backed companies achieve an employment growth of 14.1 persons three years 
after the initial investment while the equivalent number for non-PE backed companies is 
only 2.1 persons. Finally, Alén (2012) shows that PE backed companies experience 6 
%-points higher annual employment growth than the control group.  Also these results 
reflect the relatively small size of Finnish PE backed companies; employment growth is 
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naturally higher in relatively small, fast growing firms than in large, mature 
corporations. 
2.3.3. Innovation  
Literature on the impact of private equity on innovation focuses primarily on venture 
capital. This is natural as innovation is often associated with young, high-tech 
companies that typically receive VC rather than buyout funding. Furthermore, results on 
the effect of private equity on company innovativeness are diverse. Several studies have 
found that PE funding is associated with increased innovativeness (Kortum & Lerner 
2000), while other studies report no statistically significant relationship between PE 
investments and innovation (Popov & Roosenboom 2012). In addition, it has been 
suggested that potential positive relationship between PE funding and innovation would 
be due to selection effect rather than post-investment value added of private equity 
(Engel & Keilbach 2007). 
One of the most cited articles on the impact of private equity investing on innovation is 
the study of Kortum & Lerner (2000). By analysing the number of issued patents in the 
US during 1965-1992, Kortum & Lerner (2000) find a significant positive relationship 
between increased venture capital activity and the number of issued patents. They argue 
that VC funding may have accounted for approximately 8% of the industrial innovation 
during 1983-1992 in the United States.  
In contrast, Popov & Roosenboom (2012) argue that European VC funds have been less 
successful in promoting innovation than their US peers. They study a sample of VC 
investments in 21 European countries during 1991-2005 and compare their results to 
those of Kortum & Lerner (2000). They argue that while the effect of European VC 
investing on patenting activity can be considered mostly positive, statistical significance 
of these results is questionable. They also note that results vary greatly between 
countries. The effect of VC investing on industrial innovation was found to be stronger 
in those countries with low barriers to entrepreneurship and VC-friendly regulatory and 
tax environment.  
Results of Engel & Keilbach (2007) indicate that rather than facilitating innovation 
activities of start-ups, VC investors choose to invest in already innovative companies. 
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Engel & Keilbach (2007) study a sample of German VC funded companies, their 
matched comparable companies and changes in the number of patent applications, and 
find that although VC backed companies are more innovative than their peers, these 
companies were more innovative already before receiving funding from a VC company.  
These results indicate that instead of boosting innovativeness, VC investors focus on 
commercialisation of innovations. These findings are in line with the study of Hellmann 
& Puri (2000), which shows that  of innovative firms are more likely to receive venture 
funding.  
González-Uribe (2013) provides another interesting perspective on relationship between 
PE funding and innovation. González-Uribe (2013) studies patents of VC backed 
companies that were issued before the VC investment and compares how the number of 
citations of those patents developed after the investment compared to the number of 
citations of other patents invented by non-VC funded companies. One main finding of 
González-Uribe (2013) is that after the VC investment, patents of VC backed 
companies received a significantly larger number of citations than comparable patents. 
In addition, González-Uribe (2013) notices that the key driver of this subsequent 
increase in the number of citations was the increase in the number of citations from 
companies that had received funding from the same VC. These findings imply that VC 
investors facilitate the diffusion of knowledge among their portfolio companies and 
hence have an important role in facilitating innovation. 
Regarding buyouts, Lerner et al. (2011) examine whether changes in patenting activity 
before and after the LBO support the public belief that PE investors sacrifice long-term 
development to gain short-term returns By studying the sample of 472 LBO transactions 
three years before and five years after the investment, Lerner et al. (2011) examine how 
the number of patent citations and nature of patenting activity have changed. Lerner et 
al. argue that contrary to the public belief, the number of patent-to-patent citations 
increases after the buyout. However, Lerner et al. (2011) study only buyout backed 
companies, and hence, based on this study, it is impossible to say whether buyout 
funded companies are more innovative than their non-PE funded peers. 
Considering Finland, there is no clear indication of the positive relationship between PE 
funding and increased company innovativeness. Männistö (2009) measures company 
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innovativeness as the growth of intangible assets and finds that this indicator is 
positively associated with PE funding. However, this results it not statistically 
significant at 95% confidence level. In addition, Alén (2012) shows that PE backed 
companies in general are not more innovative than their matched peers. However, by 
analysing VC funded companies and buyouts separately, Alén (2012) notices that VC 
backed companies demonstrate higher innovativeness in terms of new patents and R&D 
intensity than their matched peers. In conclusion, results of Männistö (2009) and Alén 
(2012) imply that in Finnish portfolio companies, PE investors in general focus on 
commercializing innovations rather than creating them, as suggested by Engel & 
Keilbach (2007) and Hellmann & Puri (2000).  
2.3.4. Internationalization 
Studies on impact of private equity on portfolio company internationalization typically 
consider the question when does the involvement of PE investor lead to increased 
international activity. In this sense, this stream of studies is relatively close to studies on 
the value added by private equity. Factors that affect positively company 
internationalization include international experience of the management (Carpenter et 
al. 2003), international experience of the investor (Fernhaber & Mcdougall-Covin 
2009), type of owner (George et al. 2005) and domicile of the investor (Mäkelä & 
Maula 2005). 
Carpenter et al. (2003) describe VC investors as “reasoned risk takers” i.e. VC 
investors are willing to promote portfolio company internationalization and carry 
associated risks if there are some significant risk mitigating factors. Carpenter et al. 
(2003) study a sample of relatively young IPO firms in the electrical and electronic 
equipment industry and examine whether VC backing and international experience of 
top-management and/or board members appointed by the VC investor affect 
international sales of the portfolio company. Contrary to their initial hypothesis, 
Carpenter et al. (2003) notice that VC backing itself has negative effect on the extent of 
international sales of the company. However, Carpenter et al. (2003) find that if top 
management team and/or board members have international experience, the relationship 
between VC funding and global sales is positive. This means that the effect of VC 
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funding on company internationalization depends on risks and risk-mitigating factors, 
such as relevant international experience. 
Similarly to Carpenter et al. (2003), George et al. (2005) examine how the ownership 
structure of the company affect attitudes to risk taking and further internationalization. 
More specifically, George et al. (2005) study a relationship between internal (i.e. CEO 
and top-management team) and external (i.e. institutional and VC investors) ownership 
on the scale and scope of internationalization of Swedish SMEs. In this case, scale of 
internationalization refers to the extent to which the company operates internationally 
while scope of internationalization means the number countries to which the company 
exports its products. George et al. (2005) notice that VC funding is associated with the 
increased scale, but not scope, of SME internationalization, and that this effect is even 
stronger if also the CEO or the top-management team ownership is present. According 
to George et al. (2005), these findings imply that one central value creation mechanism 
of private equity is the alignment of goals of owners and managers, which increases the 
risk appetite of the company and further promotes, for example, internationalization.  
Findings of Zahra et al. (2007) provide support for the results of Carpenter et al. (2003) 
and George et al. (2005). Instead of international exports or operations, Zahra et al. 
(2007) study how international knowledge-based resources, such as developing new 
products to international markets and focusing R&D efforts on international business, 
are affected by top-management team and VC ownership in US-based SMEs. Zahra et 
al. (2007) conclude that both top-management team and VC ownership are associated 
with the development of these resources. In addition, Zahra et al. (2007) argue that this 
relationship is intensified if the company has outside board members. Based on their 
findings, Zahra et al. (2007) suggest that besides monitoring, external board members, 
who in the case of VC backed companies are often appointed by VC investors, have 
also a more supporting role that can promote the development of international 
capabilities in VC funded companies.  
Mäkelä & Maula (2005) provide another interesting perspective on the relationship 
between VC funding and portfolio company internationalization. They argue that the 
effect of VC funding on portfolio company internationalization depends on the fit 
between the target market of the company and the domicile of the VC. In their multiple-
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case study of 9 Finland-based companies, Mäkelä & Maula (2005) propose that “foreign 
investors tend to drive portfolio companies towards their home markets”. Hence, 
Mäkelä & Maula (2005) conclude that the involvement of the VC investor can have 
either a positive or negative effect on internationalization of the venture depending on 
whether the domicile of the VC is the same as the target market of the portfolio 
company. According to Mäkelä & Maula (2005), the positive effect is due to 
endorsement, knowledge of the local environment and increased legitimacy of the 
venture provided by a local investor.  
Fernhaber & Mcdougall-Covin (2009) consider the role of international experience and 
reputation of the VC in new venture internationalization.  By studying young, US-based 
high-tech companies Fernhaber & Mcdougall-Covin (2009) find that international 
experience of the VC who serves in the board of the portfolio company is positively 
associated with the company internationalization measured by multi-item scale 
including the scope of internationalization and international sales and asset intensity. In 
addition, Fernhaber & Mcdougall-Covin (2009) show that this positive effect of 
international knowledge on internationalization is stronger if the VC is also highly 
reputable.  
In the Finnish context, Alén (2012) finds that, in terms of growth of export intensity and 
share of foreign board members, Finnish PE backed companies are after the investment 
more international than their matched control group. However, Alén (2012) notes that 
neither the actual sample or the matched control group operate especially 
internationally, as the overall export intensity and the number of foreign mergers and 
acquisitions are relatively low in both groups. 
2.3.5. Impact on the overall economy 
Effect of private equity on the overall economy is, in general, found to be positive. 
Typical indicators for economic impact are productivity growth of the economy 
(Romain & van Pottelsberghe 2004), firm entries (Samila & Sorenson 2010) and 
increase in corporate taxes (Alemany & Martí 2005).  
By analysing a panel data of 16 OECD countries during 1990-2001, Romain & van 
Pottelsberghe (2004) argue that venture capital funding contributes to the overall 
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economic performance by improving productivity growth. Researchers show that VC 
funding is a more important factor contributing to productivity growth than public or 
business R&D. Romain & van Pottelsberghe (2004) analyse that there are two key 
mechanisms why venture capital contributes to the economic growth. First, venture 
capital funding increases product and process innovation. Second, venture capital helps 
the economy to absorb new knowledge produced by universities and companies. 
Findings of Samila & Sorenson (2010) provide support for the latter-discussed 
mechanism of Romain & van Pottelsberghe (2004). Samila & Sorenson (2010) study 
patenting activity and firm births in the United States during 1993-2002 and find that 
there is a positive relationship between government grants to universities and patenting 
rates and firm formation, which is intensified as the amount of venture capital activity 
increases. In conclusion, Samila & Sorenson (2010) argue “that the public funding of 
academic research and venture capital have a complementary relationship in fostering 
innovation and the creation of new firm”. 
Besides productivity growth, another typical way to measure the impact of private 
equity on the overall economy are corporate taxes. For example, Alemany & Martí 
(2005) find that in the Spanish context, VC backed companies experience higher 
corporate tax growth than their non-VC backed peers. In addition, Alemany & Martí 
(2005) show that cumulative venture capital funding has a positive relationship with 
growth in corporate taxes. 
In Finland, Männistö (2009) and Alén (2012) have studied the effect of private equity 
on corporate tax payments. Männistö (2009) finds no relationship between PE funding 
and cumulative corporate tax payments. In contrast, Alén (2012) finds a statistically 
significant relationship between PE funding and relative growth in corporate taxes. 
However, considering only venture capital, results of Alén (2012) imply that corporate 
taxes of VC backed companies grow slower than those of their matched peers. Alén 
(2012) provides one explanation for this perhaps somewhat surprising result by 
highlighting that fast-growing companies also invest more heavily in R&D – 
investments in R&D are considered as intangible assets, which can be further written 
off to decrease taxable profit.  
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2.4. Research on the value added by PE investors 
This chapter is divided into three parts based on different streams of research. The first 
research stream focuses on the screening capabilities of PE investors while the second 
field of studies examines what PE investors do after the investment in order to boost the 
performance of their investments. The third line of research argues that some investors 
have qualities, such as reputation, that enable them to pick the best investment targets 
and/or provide better value-adding services to their portfolio companies.  
2.4.1. Value added through target selection 
Studies that will be discussed in this chapter focus solely on venture capital, and hence, 
next discussed results are not directly applicable to the whole private equity sector. 
Nevertheless, research on the value added through target selection provides valuable 
insights on the role of the VC investor’s screening capabilities – and also limitations of 
those capabilities. The next introduced studies can roughly be divided into two 
categories; those examining the decision making process of VC investors and those 
trying to measure the effect of target selection on the superior performance of PE 
backed companies. The line between these two research streams is not clear as both 
streams are interested for example in the investment decision criteria used by PE 
investors. The difference between these research streams is rather methodological and 
temporal as the first line of research consists mainly of interview and survey studies 
conducted during late 1980s and late 1990s while the second line of research includes 
more recent, often econometric, analyses.  
Studies of Tyebjee & Bruno (1984), Macmillan et al. (1986) and MacMillan et al. 
(1987) belong to the first-mentioned group of studies. A survey study of Tyebjee & 
Bruno (1984) examine 91 portfolio companies from 41 VC firms in the United States. 
Tyebjee & Bruno (1984) present that market attractiveness and product differentiation 
are main factors affecting expected return. On the other hand, researchers note that 
managerial capabilities and environmental threat resistance are inversely related to 
expected risk. In other words, an ideal portfolio company would be one that is in a 
highly attractive market, is not vulnerable to outside threats and has a unique product as 
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well as experienced and skilled top-management team that is able to mitigate possible 
risk associated with high-growth. 
Findings of Macmillan et al. (1986) somewhat differ from those of  Tyebjee & Bruno 
(1984). In their survey study of 102 US VC companies, Macmillan et al. (1986) argue 
that the primary selection criteria of venture capital investors are characteristics of the 
entrepreneur rather than market- or product-related factors. On the other hand, findings 
of the subsequent study of MacMillan et al. (1987) do not provide support for the claim 
that managerial capabilities as the most important screening criteria would be a good 
predictor of portfolio company performance. MacMillan et al. (1987) asked 67 VC 
companies to rate 150 portfolio companies, both successful and unsuccessful, in terms 
of screening criteria. The main result of this study is that only two factors, ability to 
protect the portfolio company from competition and market acceptance of the product, 
consistently predict portfolio company success. 
As these somewhat contradictory results indicate, earliest studies on the screening 
criteria used by VC investors can be considered somewhat biased as they often rely on 
interviews of VC investors themselves or survey data. By examining 51 US venture 
capital companies, Zacharakis & Meyer (1998) notice that VC investors stated decision 
policy (i.e. how VC investors think they choose their investment targets) differs from 
their actual decision-making criteria. According to Zacharakis & Meyer (1998), this 
finding implies that VC investors do not fully understand their own decision-making 
processes. However,  authors note that although VC investors lack a clear understanding 
of their intuitive decision-making process, they still tend to make consistent investment 
decisions. 
The second line of research tries to measure whether the superior performance of VC 
backed companies is due to screening ability of VC investors or value-adding activities 
provided by VC investors. For example, results of Engel & Keilbach (2007) imply that 
higher innovativeness of VC backed companies is due to screening effect rather than 
value-adding activities. As discussed in Chapter 2.2., they state that VC backed 
companies are more innovative than their non-VC backed peers already before the 
investment, which means that VC investors tend to invest in innovative companies. 
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On the other hand, Baum & Silverman (2004) argue that VC investors not only pick the 
most promising companies i.e. act as “scouts” but also act as “coaches” providing 
management expertise to their portfolio companies. Baum & Silverman (2004) study a 
sample of Canadian biotech companies and compare company characteristics that 
attract VC funding to those characteristics that predict future company performance. 
Key findings of aum & Silverman (2004) are that technological superiority is associated 
both with the likelihood to receive VC funding and future success while top 
management team characteristics, such as the size of the management team, that attract 
VC funding have no significant effect on future performance. According to Baum & 
Silverman (2004), results indicate that VC investors tend to choose technologically 
strong and strategically networked companies but may overemphasize human capital 
factors in their investment decisions. Authors analyse that VC investors may finance 
companies that have strong long-term prospects due to, for example, their technological 
superiority but require additional management expertise.  
Findings of Colombo & Grilli (2010) support to some extent results of Baum & 
Silverman (2004). Colombo & Grilli (2010) studied a sample of 439 Italian companies 
that were established during 1980-1999 and were still operating in 2004. Similarly to 
the method of Baum & Silverman (2004), Colombo & Grilli (2010) compare those 
human capital characteristics of founder that attract VC investments to those that predict 
future growth. They find that those founder characteristics that predict future growth 
significantly differ from those that increase the probability of the VC investment. 
According to Colombo & Grilli (2010), this implies that the screening of Italian VC 
investor does not function properly either due to the lack of VC investors’ screening 
ability or unwillingness of the most promising ventures to obtain VC financing. On the 
other hand, results of Colombo & Grilli (2010)  support the “VC investors as coaches” 
hypothesis. Authors notice that those human capital characteristics of the founder that 
predict the growth of non-VC backed ventures do not indicate future growth when the 
company receives VC financing. According to Colombo & Grilli (2010), one 
explanation for this may be that involvement of the professional investor may be more 
beneficial for less experienced entrepreneurs. 
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Also results of Croce et al. (2013) provide support for the finding that in the European 
context, the coach function of VC investing may be stronger than the scout function. 
Authors of the study examine a sample of relatively young companies (i.e. less than 20 
years old in 2010) in six European countries and show that before the VC investment, 
there are no notable differences in productivity growth between VC backed and non-VC 
backed companies. However, Croce et al. find that after the VC investment, the 
productivity growth of VC backed companies is significantly higher than that of the 
matched control group. Moreover, authors note the accelerated productivity growth of 
VC backed companies does not decrease after the VC exit implying that VC 
investments have a long lasting impact on productivity. These results mean that in terms 
of productivity growth, VC investors do not tend to choose the already top-performing 
companies. Instead, VC investments seem to promote productivity growth of funded 
companies during the investment period. 
Sorensen (2007) provides another interesting viewpoint on the screening ability of VC 
investors by taking the experience of the VC company into consideration. The author 
examines VC investments in Massachusetts and California during 1982-1995 and finds 
that companies financed by experienced VC companies are more likely to experience a 
successful exit through an IPO. According to the author, this is due both to screening 
capabilities of more experienced investors and greater value added. Findings of 
Sorensen (2007) not only provide further information on the screening abilities of 
different types of VC companies but they also indicate that investors have 
heterogeneous skills that differentiate top-performing investors from their peers. This 
topic will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.4.3. 
In sum, it can be concluded that ability of VC investors to assess their own screening 
criteria is somewhat limited. This does not, however, mean that VC investors would not 
make good investment decisions. In addition to screening effect, VC investors add value 
by “coaching” their portfolio companies during the investment. This finding is the 
motivation for the next discussed stream of research – value added through active 
ownership. 
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2.4.2. Value added through active ownership 
This stream of literature studies non-financial services that PE investors offer to their 
portfolio companies. The list of studied activities is extensive including monitoring 
(Jensen 1989; Gorman & Sahlman 1989), strategic and operational advice (e.g. 
Sapienza et al. 1996; Bruining & Wright 2002), and professionalization of the company 
(Hellmann & Puri 2002). These non-financial services are the core of active ownership 
and hence the central topic in this thesis. The aim of the following paragraphs is to 
comprehensively and logically summarise the main findings of this line of research. For 
the sake of clarity, this chapter is divided into two subchapters in terms of investor type 
as studies on non-financial services provided by buyout and VC investors have 
somewhat different focuses. 
2.4.2.1. VC investors as growth facilitators 
Earliest studies that explore the value added by VC investors try to answer fundamental 
questions such as how VC investors are involved in their investments. Studies in this 
field include, for example, articles of MacMillan et al. (1989), Gorman & Sahlman 
(1989), Sapienza (1992), and Sapienza et al. (1996). These studies are typically 
conducted as survey studies in which respondents are investment managers of US-based 
VC funds, or in the case of Sapienza (1992) entrepreneur-CEOs of US-based VC 
backed companies. 
The survey study of MacMillan et al. (1989) is one of the first pieces of research 
exploring value-adding activities of venture capital investors. MacMillan et al. (1989) 
argue that the most important non-financial services provided by VC investors are 
mainly related to finance, including, for example, monitoring of the financial 
performance and interfacing with the investor group. Authors of the study also identify 
three levels of investment but find no relationships between the improved performance 
of the portfolio company and the level of investor involvement.  
Findings of Gorman & Sahlman (1989) support those of MacMillan et al. (1989). 
Gorman & Sahlman (1989 argue that approximately 60% of VC investors time is used 
for monitoring of portfolio companies, and that the most important role of the VC 
investor is to help the company raise additional funding. Authors also identify 
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additional value-adding activities such as strategic and operational planning, recruiting 
of the management, introducing companies to new customers and suppliers and 
resolving of compensation issues.  
Sapienza (1992) explore the CEO-VC relationship and the perceived value added of the 
VC involvement in the United States during late 1980s. He shows that the perceived 
value of VC involvement is higher if the CEO-VC relationship is conflict-free, the 
communication between the investor and the CEO is open and the company that 
received funding is involved in innovation activities.  Sapienza (1992) also notices that 
higher perceived value added is positively associated with venture performance. 
However, based on this study, it is impossible to determine the direction of the 
perceived value-performance relationship: does higher perceived value affect good 
performance or does good performance improve perceived value?  
Study of Sapienza et al. (1996) is special in the sense that it is one of the first cross-
country studies in the field of private equity research. Sapienza et al. (1996) compare 
survey data from four countries, namely the US, the UK, Germany and France and find 
that level of involvement differs significantly between countries. The level of 
involvement and also the value added, which is measured as perceived importance of a 
certain role multiplied by the VC investor’s perceived effectiveness in carrying out this 
same role, are highest in the US and the UK and lowest in France. Despite differences 
in the value added and extent of involvement across countries, VC investors in all four 
countries saw providing of financial and strategic advice and acting as a sounding board 
to the management as their primary roles. 
More recent studies on value-adding services provided by VC investors include those of 
Hellmann & Puri (2000) and Hellmann & Puri (2002). These studies approach the topic 
from a more quantitative perspective. Both studies utilise a sample of 173 Silicon 
Valley –based start-ups. This data set combines survey data with interviews with key 
managers of these companies. Compared to earlier survey studies in this field, key 
advantage of this data set is richness of the data as well as the high response rate of 80% 
of the original survey that was sent to VC investors. Together these studies provide 
valuable and widely cited insights on non-financial services provided by VC investors. 
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In the earlier published piece of study, Hellmann & Puri (2000) find that innovative 
companies are more likely to receive VC funding, and that investor involvement is 
associated with shorter time to bring a new product to market. In addition, the study 
shows that this acceleration effect is intensified in the case of innovative companies. On 
one hand, the finding that innovative companies have a higher probability to obtain VC 
funding provides support for the earlier discussed screening capabilities of PE investors. 
On the other hand, the result that VC funding facilitates the commercialization of 
innovations implies that PE investors provide not only financing but also value-adding 
services that may have a positive effect on future performance. Besides accelerated 
commercialization, VC investors can also help young companies to professionalize their 
organizations. Hellmann & Puri (2002) argue that VC funding is associated with several 
professionalization measures such as adoption of a stock option plan. Hellmann & Puri 
(2002) also show that VC funding increases the probability that the company will 
replace the founder with an outside CEO.  
Findings of Hsu (2006) indicate that VC investors also have a role as facilitators of 
cooperative activity in their portfolio companies. By comparing publicly funded and VC 
backed companies, Hsu (2006) shows that VC funding is associated with co-operative 
activity e.g. in R&D and increased likelihood of the IPO. However, the researcher notes 
that based on this single study, a causal relationship between VC funding and increased 
cooperation activity can not be established. For example, by referring to findings of 
Hellmann & Puri (2000), Hsu (2006) analyses that as VC companies tend to invest in 
innovative companies and innovation is associated with formation of alliances, 
increased post-investment cooperation activity may be caused by pre-investment 
innovativeness rather than influence of the VC investor.  
Kaplan & Strömberg (2004) offer an additional viewpoint to the value added by VC 
investors. They study investment analyses and investment contracts of 67 VC backed 
companies from 11 VC investors during 1986-1999 and divide value-adding activities 
into intervening and supporting ones. Kaplan & Strömberg (2004) define intervening 
actions those that are likely to cause conflict between the VC investor and the 
management while supporting actions are those activities that are an unlikely source of 
conflict between the VC investor and the management. Kaplan & Strömberg (2004) find 
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that the higher the board control of the VC investor, the higher the level of intervening 
actions. In contrast, the higher the equity stake of the VC fund, the more the VC 
investor provides supporting services.  
In conclusion, earlier studies on value-adding services provided by VC investors 
indicate that in addition to financing, VC investors provide also non-financial support to 
their portfolio companies. This support, whether professionalization measures, strategic 
or financial advice or accelerated commercialization, seems to be aiming at enabling the 
portfolio company to achieve the expected fast growth during the investment period. 
Hence, based on the existing academic research, VC investors provide non-financial 
services that, in one way or another, facilitate growth, which further leads to successful 
portfolio company performance and investment case. 
2.4.2.2. Buyout investors as promoters of efficiency and 
entrepreneurship  
In his pioneering article, Jensen (1989) argues that the key value-adding mechanism in 
buyouts is decreased agency costs. Jensen (1989) proposes three main factors affecting 
this phenomenon – debt, active ownership through managing and monitoring of 
portfolio companies and equity ownership of the management. In conclusion, this 
traditional view on the value-adding mechanisms of buyouts emphasises increased 
efficiency in the portfolio company – a buyout investor removes inefficiencies by 
increasing monitoring and discipline, and aligning interests of the top-management team 
with those of owners.  
Several researchers have suggested that besides efficiency, buyout investors may also 
facilitate growth in their portfolio companies. For example, studies of Wright et al. 
(2000), and Wright et al. (2001) present that while some buyouts inevitably promote 
increased efficiency, there are also those buyouts that foster strategic innovation. This 
way, buyouts can promote, for example, revitalization of more mature companies 
(Wright et al. 2000; Wright et al. 2001). 
Studies of Bruining & Wright (2002) and Bruining et al. (2013) continue from the 
findings of  Wright et al. (2000), and Wright et al. (2001). Bruining & Wright (2002) 
and Bruining et al. (2013) highlight the role of PE investors as promoters of 
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entrepreneurial behaviour. Bruining & Wright (2002) use the concept of entrepreneurial 
orientation (EO), which, in this study, refers to the definition of Lumpkin & Dess 
(1996). According to Lumpkin & Dess (1996) an organization that possesses 
entrepreneurial orientation has five key characteristics – innovativeness, proactiveness, 
competitive aggressiveness, risk-taking and autonomy. Bruining & Wright (2002) 
analyse two MBO cases through the EO framework and find that case companies act 
more entrepreneurially after the MBO than before it. Researchers analyse that 
knowledge transfer, monitoring and networks are central mechanism behind increased 
EO.  
Bruining et al. (2013) utilise the framework of entrepreneurial and administrative 
management conceptualised by Stevenson & Gumpert (1985) and later operationalized 
by Brown et al. (2001). Based on Stevenson & Gumpert (1985), entrepreneurial 
management is an opportunity-seeking management style that is not restricted by 
resources currently owned by the organization. The opposite of this management style is 
administrative management that is a set of more inward-focused management practices 
driven by resources currently controlled by the organization (Stevenson & Gumpert 
1985). By comparing PE backed buyouts to non-PE backed buyouts in Netherlands, 
Bruining et al. (2013) find that after the buyout, PE backed buyouts experience 
significant increases in both entrepreneurial and administrative management practices. 
Researchers note that increase in administrative management is driven by high leverage, 
which is typical in PE backed buyouts.  
In conclusion, both agency cost and entrepreneurship perspectives are relevant 
frameworks to examine non-financial services provided by buyout investors. Bruining 
et al. (2013) summarise well the interrelation of these two viewpoints: PE investors 
promote the development of ambidextrous organisations – organisations that are able to 
simultaneously seek growth opportunities and maintain a sufficient level of 
administrative management. 
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2.4.3. Investor characteristics and the impact on value 
added by private equity 
While studies on the screening effect of PE investors focus on the question whether PE 
investors act as ‘scouts’, ‘coaches’ or both, and research on value added services tries to 
explain how PE investors are involved in the development of their portfolio companies, 
this line of research is interested in the question why some PE investors are more 
successful than others. More specifically, this research stream tries to find those 
investor characteristics that differentiate top-performing PE investors from others. 
Articles discussed during the next subchapter complement two other streams of value 
added studies, and provide novel insights on the value added by private equity. 
Kaplan & Schoar (2005) provide evidence that PE investors differ in terms of value-
adding capabilities. They compare average private equity fund returns with S&P 500 
during 1981-2001 and notice that although the average fund return did not outperform 
S&P 500 during the sample period, there are large differences between the returns of 
individual funds. Kaplan & Schoar (2005) find that PE investors whose fund 
outperformed the market before are more likely to have a successful and larger fund in 
the future. This means that investor experience has a positive relationship with the fund 
performance and size. These findings imply that the qualities and skills of private equity 
investors differ. Kaplan & Schoar (2005) analyse that better funds may have skilled 
general managers who are able to provide value-adding services and/or have a 
reputation that enables them to pick the most promising companies with affordable deal 
terms. 
The findings of Hsu (2004) support especially the latter viewpoint. He examines 
whether the reputation of the VC company affects the likelihood of the financing offer 
of the VC fund being accepted. Hsu (2004) claims that financing offers of highly 
reputable VC companies are significantly more likely to be accepted. In addition, the 
author states highly reputable VC companies are able to acquire the equity stake at a 10-
14% discount. In other words, entrepreneurs are ready to pay for affiliation with a 
highly reputable VC company in order to either use this affiliation as ‘a certification of 
a high-quality venture’ or benefit from the value-adding services of the VC investor.  
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On the other hand, findings of Bottazzi et al. (2008) provide evidence that investor 
experience affects the value-adding services that the venture capital investor can offer.  
Bottazzi et al. (2008) analyse a sample of European venture capital deals and argue that 
prior business experience of the investment partner correlates positively with higher 
investor involvement, which in this study consists of recruiting of managers and board 
of directors, helping with fundraising and frequent interaction with portfolio companies. 
In addition, Bottazzi et al. (2008) find that active involvement of the VC investor is also 
positively associated with portfolio company performance. 
Regarding buyout investments, the study of Acharya et al. (2013) supports the findings 
of Bottazzi et al. (2008). By comparing unlevered returns of LBO transactions in the 
Western Europe during 1991-2007 with those of quoted sector peers, Acharya et al. 
(2013) find that fund partners with operational experience (i.e. industry or management 
consulting) are associated with outperforming deals with the focus on internal value 
creation while partners with financial background (i.e. investment banking or 
accounting) are associated with outperforming deals with M&A focus. It should be 
noted that Acharya et al. (2013) focus purely on LBOs with large and mature PE firms 
involved and hence, their results can be interpreted as an extension to the results of 
Kaplan & Schoar (2005). Acharya et al. (2013)argue that M&A and operational 
expertise of partners allow large and mature i.e. more experienced PE firms to 
outperform the market. 
An alternative explanation for the superior performance of some PE investors, is 
presented by Hochberg et al. (2007) who argue that better networked VC investors 
experience better fund- and company-level performance. They study a sample of 
venture capital deals by US investors during 1980-1999 and measure fund-level success 
as a successful exit through IPO, or sale to another firm is used as a proxy for fund level 
performance while company-level performance is operationalized as survival to another 
funding round and eventual exit. Hochberg et al. (2007) find that considering investor 
network measures such as the size of the network, tendency to be invited to other 
investors’ syndicates and access to the best-networked VC investors are positively 
associated with better fund- and company-level performance.  
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In sum, it can be concluded that not all PE investors are similar; they have different 
backgrounds, capabilities and statuses. Past experience and capabilities may allow more 
experienced fund managers to provide superior value-adding services to their portfolio 
companies. On the other hand, a highly reputable PE company is also a certification of 
the venture’s quality, and a desire to affiliate with a reputable VC may result to more 
affordable deal terms for the investor. Besides experience and reputation, networks of 
individual PE investors may facilitate knowledge diffusion and provide competitive 
advantage for those PE investors who are part of these networks. 
2.5. Summary of the literature review and research questions 
The aim of this literature review is to answer the question “1) What are the value-
adding mechanisms through which private equity investors contribute to the 
performance of their portfolio companies?” Based on the existing academic research, 
value-adding mechanisms of private equity differ between buyout and venture capital 
investors. Venture capital investors add value by monitoring and mentoring their 
portfolio companies, professionalizing company policies and decreasing product-to-
market-time. In contrast, buyout investors remove organizational inefficiencies by 
monitoring and aligning incentives of the management with those of owners. 
Furthermore, buyout investors promote growth-seeking behaviour in established 
companies.  
Although private equity is widely studied topic in the academic research, these above-
discussed findings have not yet been verified in the Finnish context. In other words, 
research on the value added by Finnish PE investors is still quite limited. This notion 
leads to the following research question: 
2) How have private equity investors used value-adding mechanisms in order to 
contribute to the operational performance of their Finnish portfolio companies? 
Furthermore, findings of existing academic literature imply that investor characteristics 
affect the value added by private equity. Investor characteristics seem to affect the 
investor’s ability to both find new investment targets and provide non-financial services 
during the investment. The current academic research is rather focused on measuring 
the relationship between some individual characteristic, such as operational experience, 
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and portfolio company performance. However, it is unlikely that the pure amount of 
some individual investor characteristic (e.g. the amount of experience) would always 
yield positive portfolio company performance. As a consequence, a more fine-grained 
approach on the topic is required. This study explores which types of investor 
characteristics and combinations of characteristics are associated with positive portfolio 
company performance in the Finnish context. Hence, the third research question is the 
following:  
3) How do investor characteristics affect value added by private equity? 
Finally, the impact of industry on value added by private equity is relatively little 
studied topic in the private equity research (see Valkama et al. 2013 and Guo et al. 2011 
for exceptions). An interesting question from the value-adding mechanisms perspective 
is whether PE investors adjust their involvement according the industry of the portfolio 
company. The fourth research question is as follows: 
4) What is the role of industry characteristics on value added by private equity? 
3. Methods 
3.1. Methodology 
Despite the substantial amount of academic literature on the impact and value added of 
private equity, deeper value-adding mechanisms of private equity are not yet thoroughly 
understood. Considering the novelty of the research subject and the explanatory nature 
of the research question “How do private equity investors contribute to the performance 
of their Finnish portfolio companies”, case study is the most appropriate research 
methodology for this study (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 1994). Considering the research 
problem, a multiple case study is more suitable methodology than a single case study as 
it allows comparison between cases and, in the best scenario, reveals systematic patterns 
across cases. At best, this methodology can produce novel insights on the studied 
phenomenon and testable propositions for further research. (Eisenhardt 1989). 
The core of the multiple-case study is that it utilises replication logic i.e. treats different 
cases as distinct experiments. The aim of replication is to improve the analytical 
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generalizability of the results. (Yin 1994) As a consequence, the purpose of the case 
study is not to test hypotheses and provide statistically significant results but to produce 
theoretically meaningful insights on the studied phenomenon (Eisenhardt & Graebner 
2007). In addition, it should be noted that this methodology is highly iterative in nature, 
which means that analysed data and initial results are constantly compared with original 
propositions and findings of the existing academic literature (Eisenhardt 1989). 
The traditional case study method is further supported by a set-theoretic method called 
fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA). The fsQCA method aims at finding 
combinations of causal conditions that lead to a certain outcome. The key advantage of 
fsQCA is that while examining causal recipes, it takes the complexity of the 
phenomenon into account; a certain outcome can be produced by several different 
configurations. Hence, the method bridges the gap between inductive, small-N 
qualitative approach and large-N, quantitative methods. (Ragin 2000) In this study, 
fsQCA examines the potential impact of investor expertise and environmental factors on 
case company performance.   
Considering the research problem, the most natural unit of analysis for this study is the 
post-deal development of Finnish companies that have received private equity funding.  
To ensure the topicality of the results, the time frame of the potential cases was limited 
to those companies that had received private equity funding during 2007-2011. 
3.2. Case selection 
As suggested by Eisenhardt (1989), cases were chosen by following theoretical, not 
random sampling. This means that cases were chosen deliberately and the sample 
includes cases, which are, for example, extreme examples of the studied phenomenon or 
fill theoretical categories that emerge from the existing academic research (Eisenhardt 
& Graebner 2007). Theoretical sampling allows us to utilise the above discussed 
replication logic i.e. compare what type of outcomes different investor-company 
configurations have produced. 
Based on findings of the existing research, relevant theoretical categories that were used 
in the sampling are the type of funding the company has received, investor experience, 
industry of the company and post-deal performance of the company (in terms of 3-year 
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sales CAGR1  after the investment). An ideal situation would be that one would have 24 
cases that all present different configurations of sampling dimensions. In practice, cases 
were selected so that the final sample would include as diverse group of case companies 
as possible across these four dimensions. Table 1 summarises categories used in 
sampling and related literature. 
 
1 CAGR= compound annual growth rate. Calculated as �𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 𝑦𝑦𝑅𝑅𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 3
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅 𝑦𝑦𝑅𝑅𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 03 − 1 
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 Table 1. Sampling dimensions. 
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 Cases were selected by using the combination of bottom-up screening and discussions 
with industry experts. Main data sources in the screening phase were the data set 
collected by Alén (2012) and publicly available secondary information, such as news 
releases of private equity companies. The result of this screening was a long list of 
potential cases, which was further discussed with the members of the research 
committee of the Finnish Venture Capital Association. Based on these discussions, the 
scope of the study and the list of cases were further iterated.  
Considering investor experience, it should be noted that cases were selected based on 
the experience of the PE company rather than that of an individual investment manager. 
However in the analysis phase, the data revealed that experience of, and further 
expertise and contacts provided by, the investment manager played much more 
important role than, for example, the age or size of the PE company. In addition, the 
final sample includes a smaller number of ‘zero-growth’ cases than initially planned due 
to reluctance of some investors to give an interview about more challenging cases. The 
final case list includes in total 15 cases from various industries and with varying 
investors, post-deal growth strategies and performances. Table 2 and Table 3 
summarise the key characteristics of the final sample. 
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Table 2. Sample summary: investment types and post-investment performance. 
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Table 3. Sample summary: descriptive statistics. 
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3.3. Data collection 
The main data sources of this study are interviews with investment managers and CEOs 
of case companies. The total number of interviews is 23 and on average one interview 
lasted approximately 45 minutes. 5 out of 8 interviews with CEOs were conducted 
already before this study by FVCA. However, as these interviews discussed the same 
topics as this study, they were considered as highly relevant data sources and included 
in the analysis. Table 4 summarises conducted interviews in each case. In addition, all 
interviewees were asked to answer a short survey considering their perceptions about 
the rate of change and uncertainty of the industry in which the case company operates. 
Considering this survey, data was obtained for 11 out of 15 cases. 
Table 4. Primary data sources. 
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In addition to interview data, secondary sources were utilised in order to acquire 
complementary information on case companies. Financial performance data, including 
sales, EBITDA and EBIT figures three years before and three years after the first PE 
investment, was acquired from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database. Information on 
financing rounds was collected from VentureXpert database provided by Securities 
Data Company. Furthermore, information on the prior work experience and length of 
the career in private equity of investment managers was collected from company web 
pages, Linkedin and Bloomberg Businessweek. 
3.4. Data analysis 
The data was analysed by using two complementary techniques. First, a traditional case 
study was conducted. In addition, two interesting themes that arose during within- and 
cross-case analyses were studied in more detail by using a fuzzy-set qualitative 
comparative analysis (fsQCA) technique. This combination of techniques allows a more 
rich and comprehensive overview of the topic. During the next two subchapters, both 
techniques will be discussed in more detail. 
3.4.1. Within-case and cross-case analyses 
In the first step of the data analysis phase, all interviews were recorded and field notes 
of cases, which summarise the initial impressions about cases, were written within 24 
hours after each interview. This ’24-hour rule’ ensures that data analysis and collection 
are overlapping and complementary rather than separate processes (Eisenhardt 1989). In 
addition, all interviews were transcribed as soon as possible and open coding of 
transcribed interviews was started already in the data collection phase. In other words, 
the data collection and analysis phases were partly overlapping processes. 
The first step of the actual data analysis was within-case analysis. First, all data was 
collected into one place by using the qualitative data analysis software, ATLAS.ti. After 
that, all cases were analysed separately and initial propositions developed. This step 
also included open coding of the interview data. After this within-case analysis, cases 
were compared with each other. The aim of this step was to find similarities and 
differences in investor involvement and resources provided by PE investors across 
cases. In this phase, initial findings were also compared with insights presented in the 
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existing academic literature in order to find meaningful patterns from the data 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007). 
3.4.1. Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis 
fsQCA is an analysis technique and a methodology that utilises set-theoretic approach 
while trying to find combinations of causal conditions that lead to a certain outcome. In 
fsQCA, data consists of several cases or configurations (N = 8 or more) that all have 
some set membership among pre-defined causal conditions. The prefix ‘fuzzy-set’ 
means that besides representing fully or not at all some causal condition (e.g. VC 
backed vs. non-VC backed company), a case or a configuration can represent the causal 
condition to some extent (e.g. the amount of work experience in private equity in years). 
(Ragin 2000) In this study, fsQCA was utilised for examining which investor and 
industry characteristics were associated with positive portfolio company performance.  
The motivation for examining the relationship between investor characteristics and 
company performance is that several interviewed investment managers mentioned their 
own expertise and outside contacts as resources provided to portfolio companies. 
Moreover, industry characteristics were seen as a relevant dimension to be studied 
further as interview data revealed that perceived dynamism of the industry affected how 
PE investors saw the role of strategic planning in their portfolio companies. 
Furthermore, interviewed investment managers mentioned strategic positioning and, on 
the other hand, ability to change strategic direction when required as important sources 
of value.  
Typically, one piece of research includes only one fsQCA algorithm. However, this 
study includes two separate analyses instead of one. The main reason for this is that due 
to the relatively small sample size, addressing effects of both investor and industry 
characteristics on value added by private equity in one analysis is not feasible. 
According to Ragin (2008), the number of causal conditions should be kept moderate, 
preferably between three and eight. As this study explores the effect of both investor 
and industry characteristics, the number of causal conditions in one analysis would 
easily have been 6-8.  Given the relatively small number of cases, the maximum number 
of causal conditions per analysis in this study is three or four. Thus, this study includes 
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two fsQCA analyses that examine the same phenomenon through different lenses – one 
from the perspective of investor characteristics and another from environmental 
perspective. These analyses provide two complementary views on the value added by 
private equity. It should, however, be highlighted that if the sample size was larger, one 
fsQCA algorithm instead of two would have been a preferable alternative. 
The fsQCA analysis was conducted by using fs/QCA software package 
(http://www.u.arizona.edu/∼cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml). The analysis process 
consisted of three distinct steps: defining of set membership scores i.e. calibration, truth 
table analysis and final solutions. The first step, calibration, means that degrees of set 
membership of each causal condition (in a scale of 0=no membership to 1=full 
membership) are decided and calculated for each configuration (Ragin 2009). In 
practice this means that values of full membership, no membership and 50% 
membership are decided and justified for each condition after which the calibration 
algorithm is executed by using the fs/QCA software package.   
The second step of the analysis, the truth table, lists all possible combinations of causal 
conditions. For example, if one has three causal conditions the number of possible 
combinations is 23=8. In order to obtain final solutions, those configurations that do not 
include any cases that achieve the desired outcome are deleted from the truth table. In 
addition, also those combinations that do not achieve the threshold consistency are 
removed. (Ragin 2009) Consistency is a central indicator in fsQCA, and Ragin (2006) 
defines it as “degree to which the cases sharing a given condition or combination of 
conditions … agree in displaying the outcome in question”. In other words, consistency 
is high/equals 1 if the presence of the condition is often/always associated with the 
outcome. According to Ragin (2008), for small N, the minimum consistency should be 
at least 75%-80%. This guideline was followed also in this study. 
Finally, the modified truth table is used for formulating final solutions – those 
combinations of causal conditions, or causal ‘recipes’, that produce the pre-defined 
outcome. An individual condition can be either a core or peripheral causal condition for 
the studied phenomenon. According to Fiss et al. (2011), core conditions have a strong 
causal relationship with the outcome while the relationship, based on the data, is weaker 
for peripheral conditions. The fs/QCA software produces two key solution tables, 
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namely intermediate and parsimonious solutions. The parsimonious solution includes 
only core conditions while the intermediate solution includes both core and peripheral 
conditions. Solutions are typically summarised in a solution table. Table 5 provides an 
illustrative example of the solution table (see also Fiss et al. 2011 for an example). 
Table 5. Example of the fsQCA solution table. 
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As can be seen in Table 5, in addition to consistency, there is another key metric, 
coverage, that indicates the quality of the solution in fsQCA. Coverage and solution 
coverage measure how large share of the total sample an individual solution and the set 
of solutions explain the studied phenomenon (C. C. Ragin 2008). High consistency 
implies that the condition is necessary for the outcome while high coverage means that 
the condition is sufficient for the outcome (Ragin 2009). It should be noted that, 
consistency and coverage often form a trade-off. According to Ragin (2006), a 
sufficient level of consistency should be ensured before trying to maximise coverage as 
high coverage is irrelevant if the solution is not consistent. 
In this study, fsQCA method was used for theory building rather than hypothesis testing 
purposes. Although the above-described methodology may look straightforward, it 
should be noted that, like the study in general, also the fsQCA phase of the study was an 
iterative process. First, within-case and cross-case analyses provide initial combinations 
of possibly relevant conditions, which are analysed by using the fsQCA software. After 
that, results of the fuzzy-set analysis are again compared with within- and cross-case 
analyses and theoretical propositions are further developed. This cycle is repeated until 
the results of the fuzzy-set analysis and cross-case analysis sufficiently capture the 
essence of the studied phenomenon.  
4. Results 
This chapter presents the key results of this study. First, I will summarise the most 
common ways in which investors of case companies participate in the development of 
their portfolio companies. In addition, I will discuss whether PE investors, through 
active ownership, can promote entrepreneurial, opportunity-seeking management style 
and, on the other hand, also more formalised management practices in their portfolio 
companies. In the second part of this chapter, fsQCA is utilised in two cross-case 
analyses. The first analysis studies the effect of investor experience on portfolio 
company performance while the second one discusses the relationship between industry 
dynamism and approach on strategic planning.  
The main finding of this chapter is that by adaptively using tools of active ownership 
PE investors are able to contribute to the development of their portfolio companies. PE 
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investors are professional risk-takers who, in the best scenario, take into account the life 
stage and industry characteristics of the portfolio company and are able to balance 
between promoting of risk-seeking behaviour and providing of risk-mitigating 
measures. In addition, successful PE investors are able to identify their own areas of 
experience and recruit outside board members with relevant, complementary experience 
and networks. As a consequence, PE investors have an important role as growth 
facilitators in Finnish companies. 
4.1. Non-financial services provided by Finnish PE investors 
Besides financial support, Finnish PE investors take an active role in the development 
of their portfolio companies. Based on data, the most typical non-financial services 
provided by Finnish PE investors are presented in Table 6 below.  
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 Table 6. Typical forms of investor involvement and related objectives. 
 
All2 of the above-presented activities are to some extent present in all 15 cases. Thus, it 
would be unreasonable to argue that the pure existence of some specific non-financial 
2 This activity may include participation in the recruitment of various members of the top-management 
team. However, recruiting of the new CEO is the single most visible form of this type of activity and it is 
difficult to assess to what extent different PE investors are involved in the recruitment of other key 
managers (who are direct sub-ordinates of the CEO and hence ultimately recruited by the CEO rather than 
the PE investor). Hence, further chapters will mainly discuss recruiting of a new CEO as a way to 
revitalize or professionalize the company. 
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service, such as improved monitoring or involvement in strategic planning, would be 
value adding itself. What seems to be more important is the objective to perform certain 
activities. For example, based on the interviews PE investors recruit a new CEO in 
order to achieve one of the two distinct desired outcomes, professionalization or 
revitalization of the organization. Hence, the act of recruiting a new CEO is not value 
adding itself, but the value added comes from the ability to recruit the most suitable 
person i.e. the person who is able to contribute to the desired outcome. In conclusion, I 
argue that the value added by the private equity investor depends on the situation of the 
portfolio company and the ability of the PE investor to use suitable value-adding tools 
in each situation. 
4.1.1. PE investors as professional risk-takers 
In order to examine which mechanisms add value in which company-investor 
configurations, it is useful to categorise activities and their objectives presented in Table 
6 in a meaningful way (Eisenhardt 1989). By analysing reasons to provide non-financial 
services in various situations, a categorisation of investor activities into those that 
promote entrepreneurial behaviour and those that professionalize the organization 
emerged as the most suitable framework. This way non-financial services and their 
objectives presented in Table 6 can be divided into two distinct groups. First, some 
activities, such as developing monitoring practices in order to improve accountability, 
seem to make the organization more structured and hence reduce risks associated with 
expanding the business. On the other hand, for example, development of a new 
industrial vision that significantly differs from the current strategic direction can be 
considered to promote entrepreneurial, risk-seeking behaviour. Figure 4 summarises 
this categorisation.  
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Figure 4. Categorisation of non-financial services provided by Finnish PE investors. 
 
As Figure 4 shows, a certain non-financial activity such as involvement in strategic 
planning or development of the top-management team can promote either 
entrepreneurial behaviour or professionalization in the portfolio company. Hence, it is 
the content of the non-financial service, which defines whether the involvement of the 
investor promotes entrepreneurial, risk-seeking behaviour or more structured and 
systematized approach on business. In addition, as will be discussed during the next 
chapters, the current situation of the portfolio company further defines whether a certain 
type of investor involvement is value adding or not. For example, investor involvement 
in the development of internal processes, such as monitoring practices, was considered 
valuable by the interviewed CEOs of young ventures. On the other hand, several 
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interviewed investment managers mentioned that as the portfolio company becomes 
more professional, this type of involvement becomes unnecessary.  
Considering the existing academic literature, the concept of entrepreneurial orientation 
by Miller (1983) is to a large extent analogous to those non-financial services that 
promote entrepreneurial behaviour. As discussed in the literature review, impact of 
buyouts on entrepreneurial orientation has been discussed also in the existing academic 
research on value added by buyouts (see e.g. Bruining & Wright 2002; Bruining et al. 
2013; Wright et al. 2001). Considering those investor activities that promote 
professionalization, agency-theory perspective on buyouts supports the view that buyout 
investors aim at increasing efficiency in their portfolio companies (Jensen 1989). 
Furthermore, the idea that venture capital investors promote professionalization in their 
portfolio companies has been previously presented by Hellmann & Puri (2002). Results 
that will be discussed in the next-subchapter provide a complementary view on the non-
financial role of private equity and show that i) both buyout and VC investors can 
promote entrepreneurial behaviour and professionalization in their portfolio companies 
and ii) successful PE investors are able to balance between entrepreneurial, risky 
activities and risk controlling measures.  
4.1.2. Theoretical framework of non-financial services 
provided by Finnish PE investors 
The categorisation of non-financial services presented above can be used in the coding 
of interview data. In other words, quotes that refer to, for example, increased risk-taking 
in the portfolio company, recruitment of the new CEO to revitalize the organization/to 
lead a strategic growth initiative and the role of the investor as a developer of the 
original, new industrial vision are coded as ‘PE investor promotes entrepreneurial 
behaviour” while those quotes that indicate that the investor has, for example, 
contributed to improved monitoring practices and/or board work and recruited a new 
CEO to professionalize the company are coded as ‘PE investor promotes 
professionalization’. This way, case companies can be divided into two groups – those 
in which the PE investor has focused on promoting entrepreneurial behaviour and those 
in which the PE investor has focused on promoting professionalization of the 
organization. It is important to note that the categorisation into these two groups is 
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based on the focus of investor involvement as all investors in the sample seem to, at 
least to some extent, promote both types of development. By using this categorisation 
and by taking into account that buyout and VC investors focus on fundamentally 
different types of companies, the sample can be divided into four groups based on 
investor type and the focus of investor involvement. This framework is illustrated in 
Figure 5. In addition, Table 7, Table 8, Table 9 and Table 10 present how cases are 
assigned to each group. 
Figure 5. Theoretical framework of non-financial services provided by Finnish PE 
investors. 
 
These four types of cases differ in terms of investor involvement and further in terms of 
value-adding mechanisms of private equity. During the next sub-chapters, these four 
groups will be analysed in more detail and based on these analyses, propositions on 
value-adding mechanisms for each group are developed.
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Table 7. Focus of investor involvement, cases A-D. 
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Table 8. Focus of investor involvement, cases E-H. 
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Table 9. Focus of investor involvement, cases I-L. 
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Table 10. Focus of investor involvement, cases M-O. 
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 4.1.2.1. Group 1: Buyout cases with the focus on promoting 
entrepreneurial behaviour  
This first group of cases includes most of the buyout cases in the sample. Typically, 
cases in this group are relatively established with an operating history of 10 years or 
more. An exception in this sense is Case F, which was founded only a few years before 
the PE investment. A unifying theme among cases in this group is that the PE investor 
has significantly changed or at least aimed at changing the strategic direction of the 
portfolio company. This change in the strategic direction almost always includes 
international expansion. In addition, besides organic expansion efforts, growth can be 
driven by M&A: three out of seven cases in this group are ‘buy-and-build’ cases i.e. 
companies that have aggressively grown through a series of add-on acquisitions. More 
detailed case descriptions can be found in Appendix A. Radical changes in strategic 
direction do not happen accidentally and hence, one key role of the PE investor in these 
cases is to be involved in the development of the initial industrial vision. The CEO of 
Case A summarises the role of the PE investor as follows: 
"What [PE company] brought was the industrial vision to build this type of an entity. 
[PE company] supported the management, together with management scouted and 
found good acquisitions targets and acquired financing for acquisitions. [PE company] 
acted as a growth engine” 
Interviewees of case companies in this group often mentioned that one central value-
adding mechanism during the PE funds’s ownership is a medium-term value creation 
plan that is typically developed already before the investment together with the CEO or 
the top management team. This plan provides the company with guidance regarding 
strategic topics, such as positioning, growth type (organic vs. inorganic), growth pace 
(i.e. which expansion effort are taken and when) and international expansion, during the 
fund’s ownership period. The investment partner of Case E describes their approach in 
the following way: 
"Our operating model is that before we make the investment, if possible, we want, 
together with the management and a project-based advisory group, go through the plan 
 61 
about what we would like to do during the next five years, or whatever the time period 
during which we are planning to be involved in the company is" 
This value-creation plan and the original industrial vision are two tightly interlinked 
concepts: The plan is a tool to achieve the strategic vision. In the best scenario, 
successful implementation of the medium-term value creation plan leads to a well-
positioned company that has been able to grow profitably during the investment period 
and is an attractive target for further buyer candidates. The investment manager of case 
D summarises the relationship between a value-creation plan and strategic positioning 
as follows: 
"One important value creation tool is strategic positioning.  Merging many local 
companies and creating a larger Pan-Nordic player has two key advantages. First, it is 
more efficient in many ways. The second positive aspect is that the company can be sold 
much easier and at a much higher valuation" 
“(Our role was) significant, very significant. It (strategic positioning) was one of the 
key points in the original idea. … When we sold [the company] last year, buyers were 
mainly multinational corporations that had clear synergies (with [the company]), which 
further means that they can offer a much higher price than for example other private 
equity company” 
The quote above reveals another important characteristics in cases in this group. 
Although the focus of investor involvement is in promoting entrepreneurial behaviour, 
professionalization measures such as development of board work and reporting 
practices are also present. As the investment manager of Case D describes, fast growth 
is supported by a more systematized management practices: 
"In this case one clear value creation path is that small, local [companies] are in a 
creative industry and people are creative but project management may not be at the 
same level with other industries. ... Development of that (project management) and 
development of IT systems and reporting so that there would not be many surprises 
when you make 20 projects per year. And of course, considering performance 
monitoring ... we have ready value creation templates or best practices, which were 
also carried through. " 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, recruitment of the new CEO may be a non-
financial activity that the PE investor performs in order to promote entrepreneurial 
behaviour in the organization. In three out of seven cases in this group, namely in cases 
A, D and E, the PE investor has recruited a new CEO to lead strategic change. The 
investment partner of case E summarises their objective to recruit a new CEO in the 
following way: 
"It was clear that the entrepreneur, who sold his ownership in this transaction, is not 
the person who takes this (company) to the next level. ... We had a clear vision that this 
(company) needs a new management." 
The quote above implies that recruiting of the new CEO to lead strategic transformation 
is not actually an act that promotes risk-taking but rather a way to enable and facilitate 
risk-taking. 
Typically, PE investors of case companies in this group consider that their portfolio 
companies operate in somewhat predictable and stable markets (see Appendix B). It 
seems that this type of investor involvement that focuses no pre-defined value-creation 
planning and aggressive growth targets is suitable in relatively stable environments. 
However, this group includes also a few case companies, namely C and F that have 
experienced significant market turbulence during the studied time period, which has 
naturally affected the performance of these companies. The effect of market dynamism 
on value added by private equity will be analysed in more detail in Chapter 4.2.2. 
However in general, cases in this group have been highly successful in terms of sales 
development during the investment period. This implies that this type of investor 
involvement that is based on ambitious an industrial vision and a medium-term value-
creation plan, potentially including a new management team or a CEO who leads the 
transformation, is an effective value-adding mechanism in certain PE investment 
situations.  
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4.1.2.2. Group 2: Buyout cases with the focus on 
professionalization 
This group differs from the previous one in the sense that despite growth and 
internationalization efforts, the pursued change in strategic direction after the PE 
investment is not very radical. Typically, companies in this group had grown rapidly 
already before the PE investment and the growth pace was sustained or increased during 
the PE funds’s ownership. Consequently, PE investors of cases in this group also 
consider the current CEO the right person to take the company to the next level. For 
example, the investment partner of case G describes the top-management team of the 
portfolio company in the following way: 
“[The company] was a combination of a good management (team) and strong 
entrepreneurial spirit.… I have been in [the PE company] for 16 years and I have never 
seen such a strong management team in any of our other portfolio companies. And I am 
referring especially to the breadth (of skills). There are many companies in which for 
example a CFO has been more competent or some other individual managers have been 
more competent. But in terms of breadth, the core team consisted of very strong 
individuals who were competent and sales-oriented.” 
On the other hand, the main characteristic that unifies cases in this and the first analysed 
group is the approach on strategic planning. Also PE investors of cases in this group 
seem to approach strategic panning through pre-defined value-creation plans. For 
example, the investment partner of case G describes his and his colleagues’ involvement 
in strategic planning as follows:  
"Right in the beginning, when we invested the company, we sat down, both formally and 
informally, with the core team and created a development plan. ...  Considering the 
actual strategy, we met once a year and checked that this is our strategy, do we need to 
change it. However, the strategy was mainly created in the beginning and it (the initial 
strategy) was followed" 
However, companies in this group clearly differ from Group 1 in terms of the focus of 
investor involvement. Instead of increased entrepreneurial behaviour, PE investors of 
cases in this group highlighted that case companies became more professional and 
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focused after the PE investment. For example, the investment partner summarises 
change in the case company G as follows: 
"I would say that after our investment the company had a real board of directors for 
which the management had to report. ... We had once a month a board meeting for 
which the management prepared reports and presentations. I feel that this kind of shape 
up was the foundation for everything. Now [The company] was managed like a real 
company. And this does not mean that it had not been managed well before us, but I 
guess it became more conceptualized, more focused" 
"I feel that the company has always been ambitious in terms of sales, they have a very 
strong sales organization. In that sense, we did not have much to give. But considering 
profitability, I feel that the change in profitability monitoring and requirements was 
quite significant" 
Also the investment manager of case B mentions that besides fast growth, the company 
has become more structured and professional: 
"[The company] did not have the board of directors before our investment - or it was 
only in the head of the CEO. I think it (board work) has been rewarding for all of us, 
and also the operating management appreciates the support it gets from the board" 
"Besides internationalization, I think that the company has entered the next phase of 
development ... From the customer perspective, the company is now more professional. 
Also in terms of organization and concept, one person is not anymore responsible for 
everything but responsibility is now divided between different persons and 
organizational levels" 
Especially in Case B, increased professionalization does not refer only to improved 
monitoring and corporate governance but also a more analytical approach on strategic 
planning. The investment manager of case B describes how strategic planning became 
more structured after the PE investment in the following way: 
"They (the management) surely had a general idea that next to us is an economy that is 
twice as large as ours, and the market for [the product] is probably large. However, no 
one actually understood whether it really is a good market to enter and why it would be 
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and why it wouldn't be. ... We decided to do a market research and when it showed that 
we should enter the market, we started to think how to enter and what we should do 
there. We (PE investors) acted as a sparring partner to the team and the project leader 
when the actual market entry started after the summer of 2012." 
One interesting characteristics in these type of already entrepreneurial buyout backed 
companies is that interviewed investors mentioned that they felt the need to keep 
strategy focused, which sometimes meant that the investor had to decline growth ideas 
of the top-management team. For example, investment partner of Case G describes the 
role of the investor in strategic focusing in the following way: 
“We had a very entrepreneurial and positively thinking management team. There were 
quite many different ideas, like ‘let’s buy this kind of company’ and ‘let’s enter this 
market’ and ‘let’s do this’ and ‘let’s do that’. Afterwards I can say that although the 
management deserves most of the credit, also we have been acknowledged as a rigorous 
sparring partner for the management when the management team brought up these new 
ideas. We continuously considered what is our focus and what are those business areas 
in which we have the opportunity to be the market leader and really grow. … We kept 
our focus quite tight and shot down quite many new ideas, which, in retrospect, was 
smart for sure.”  
This above-discussed phenomenon is not, at least to the same extent present in Group 1. 
Interestingly, investors of the next group, i.e. VC backed companies with the focus on 
professionalization, acknowledge the need to keep strategy focused and challenge ideas 
of the top-management team. This implies that despite the investment type, PE investors 
can in some situations add value by focusing growth efforts on the most attractive 
business options. 
Both cases in this group can be considered successful in term of post-investment sales 
growth. Considering the fact that both case companies were at a phase of fast growth at 
the time of the PE investment, it can be concluded that in fast growing buyout backed 
cases, key value-adding mechanisms are professionalization of the organisation as well 
as ambitious but focused growth plans. 
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4.1.2.3. Group 3: VC cases with the focus on 
professionalization 
This third group of cases includes most VC cases of the sample. Most of these case 
companies are young ventures that, before the VC investment, had no formal board of 
directors or systematized reporting practices. In these cases, the PE investor typically is 
the party that promotes creation of these mechanisms. For example, the CEO of Case M 
describes the nature of investor involvement in the beginning of the investment period 
as follows: 
"In the beginning, they (PE investors) were exceptionally active in aspects related to 
running the business. They clearly saw that we understood and still understand our 
market and market dynamics better than anyone in the world. ... We had just entered the 
market and probably our greatest weaknesses were related to governance structures 
and basic corporate infrastructure. So, [the VC investor] as an active guy took quite an 
active role in these things - both in good and bad. Afterwards, it was definitely a good 
thing, but at that time it did not always feel like that." 
Also the CEO of Case O acknowledges the role of the PE investor as a promoter of 
more systematized reporting practices: 
"He (investment manager) has, through his own involvement, been active, and in a 
positive way. It (involvement) has driven, and not forced but enabled, development of 
reporting practices. It is a very good thing." 
Similarly to buyout backed case companies with the focus on professionalization, also 
PE investors of case companies in this group often mentioned that they challenge and 
even decline expansion plans of entrepreneurial CEOs. For example, the investment 
partner of case L describes how the company has deliberately focused its efforts only on 
the most attractive opportunities: 
 "Considering expansion efforts, the role of the board is to sharpen the focus. Many 
entrepreneurs and companies want to conquer the whole world right away, send one 
guy there and another there. But I have never seen that this would have been a 
 67 
successful plan. We have abandoned many expansion plans as we have wanted to focus 
on one or two segments." 
Considering involvement in strategic planning in portfolio companies, it seems that 
buyout and venture capital investors have slightly different approaches. As discussed in 
previous sub-chapters, buyout investors emphasized the role of predefined medium-
term value-creation plans. In contrast, venture capital investors typically described their 
role in strategic planning as participants in ongoing strategic discussion. One reason for 
these differing approaches may be the perceived industry dynamisms (see Chapter 4.2 
for more detailed analysis). While buyout investors invest in relatively established 
companies that often operate in mature and stable industries, venture capital investors 
invest in young companies that typically operate in emerging and turbulent industries. 
Interviewed venture capital investors generally thought that unpredictable, dynamic 
environment requires a more flexible approach on strategy. For example, the investment 
manager of case K describes his role in the strategic planning of the case company: 
“We do quite actively strategy work together. The world changes at a tremendous pace 
around this company. … For that matter, one has basically all the time think where this 
company is, where it should be, where the market is and where it should not be. Well, of 
course we try to think also the big picture – what problem it (the company) solves, what 
value added it provides and how it should be positioned in the market.” 
Reason to recruit a new CEO is another factor that differentiates this group from earlier 
discussed buyout cases. In young ventures, recruiting of the new CEO is a tool to 
professionalize, rather than revitalize the company. For example in case M, the CEO 
has been replaced not once but twice during the VC fund’s ownership. First, the co-
founder-CEO was replaced with a professional outside CEO one year after the first non-
seed VC investment. In 2013 when the company according to the VC investor and the 
CEO was already at a relatively stable state, the co-founder-CEO was recruited again. 
The current and once replaced CEO of the case M describes the role of the CEO as 
follows: 
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“These (replacements of the CEO) are important milestones for the company in the 
sense that these changes reflect to strategy, culture, what is done and how things are 
done here (in the company).”  
The founder-CEO was replaced with a new CEO with prior executive experience also in 
Case L. The investment partner of case L describes the effect of this change on the 
company in the following way: 
"Due to the new CEO and due to the (external) investor, (the company) has become 
much more structured. [The company] has changed tremendously from a start-up to a 
real company with processes." 
Another factor that differentiates VC backed case companies from their buyout backed 
peers is the need for legitimacy. For young ventures, PE investor can provide 
credibility, for example, in the eyes of debt provides as described the CEO of Case O: 
“We are even able to use financing services of commercial banks because we have real 
assets and real revenue. … [Three institutional investors] are all very stable and 
trustworthy names, which provides us with credibility when acquiring additional 
financing.”  
In addition to providers of additional funding, the PE investor can provide legitimacy 
for the young venture in the eyes of potential new customers. The investment manager 
of Case L describes the role of the VC investor as a provider of credibility as follows: 
“As a chairman of the board, I am quite a lot involved in these high-level negotiations. 
… It is part of my job description. However, it is the team who does these (deals) 
anyway. … (For example) In the Far East, if the board of directors or some senior 
executive (of the customer) is invited to the dinner table, also we have to have 
executives of the same level. It is part of the business culture.” 
4.1.2.4. Group 4: VC cases with the focus on promoting 
entrepreneurial behaviour  
This fourth and final group that consists only Case J differs from other cases in the 
sense that interviewed venture capital investors are also co-founders of the case 
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company and have significant prior industry experience. Hence, the Finnish VC investor 
of this case has somewhat more entrepreneurial role in the company. Consequently, the 
company can not be considered a traditional early-stage start-up. A good example of the 
more entrepreneurial approach of the Finnish VC investor is that the initial funding 
from the Finnish VC fund, individual investors and one foreign investor was used for 
launching the business at a relatively large scale right in the beginning. The investment 
partner and co-founder of the Case J describes the role of the initial funding round in the 
following way: 
”In order to launch the business, an initial funding of just over million euros was 
needed. … It (funding) enabled us to have about 20 employees from day one. Without 
the initial funding, it (the business) would have been quite impossible to launch because 
our customers are quite demanding. They demand credibility, best sponsors and (best) 
people. … Otherwise, they don’t trust that they will get all the required help and hence, 
they will not be willing to pay for it (the service).” 
After the first funding round, the company has raised additional funding not only from 
the initial investors but also from large foreign venture capital funds. Considering 
further financing rounds, this case is similar to other venture capital cases in the sense 
that one key role of the Finnish venture capital investor is to provide the company with 
credibility in the eyes of potential new investors. The investment partner of the case J 
summarises their role as an investor as follows: 
“Now other investors see that there is at least one investor and a board member who 
has industry experience and knows the industry. So, there is at least on logical and 
competent investor for this company. It is probably the most important (role of the VC 
investor).” 
Like several other case companies, also case company J decided to recruit a new CEO a 
few years after the first VC investment. However, in Case J the reason to recruit a new 
CEO differs from other VC cases: instead of professionalization, the new CEO was 
recruited to bring new ideas i.e. to renew the company. In this sense, Case J is 
somewhat similar to the first analysed Group 1. The investment partner of Case J 
describes the reason to recruit the new CEO as follows: 
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"And at some point we noticed, and it is no surprise, that we need new ways of thinking 
and doing things. ... Then we decided that now is the right time to find a new CEO who 
can bring in new blood and energy, new ideas and new ways of working." 
In sum, Case J can be considered a combination of Group 3 and Group1, which reflects 
to joint-role of the Finnish VC company on one hand as an investor and on the other 
hand as a co-founder. Case J is ‘a typical VC case’ in the sense that the Finnish VC 
investor provides the company with credibility in the eyes of other potential investors. 
On the other hand, for example the recruiting of the new CEO to revitalize the company 
and the initial investment in the building of an organization of 20 experienced 
employees can be considered as acts that promote risk taking and entrepreneurial 
behaviour in the case company.  
4.1.3. Synthesis of non-financial services provided by PE 
investors 
Based on findings of previous four sub-chapters the framework presented in Chapter 
4.1.2 can be further complemented with investor activities associated with each of the 
four groups discussed earlier. As can be seen in the further developed framework 
presented in Figure 6, each earlier-discussed case type has some similarities with other 
types of cases that are next to it (either horizontally or vertically). By using this 
framework, I will next develop propositions considering five distinct yet interlinked 
aspects.    
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Figure 6. Extended theoretical framework of non-financial services provided by Finnish 
PE investors. 
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4.1.3.1. Focus on promoting entrepreneurial behaviour vs. 
professionalization 
As discussed earlier, cases in which the PE investor promoted professionalization were 
already relatively growth-oriented companies. On the other hand, cases in which the PE 
investor focused on promoting entrepreneurial behaviour were typically established 
companies with functioning internal processes and structures. Although both types of 
investor involvement, promoting entrepreneurial behaviour and professionalization are 
to a some extent present in all cases, it can be concluded that successful PE investors 
have identified which type of management practices the portfolio company lacks and 
promoted that type of management practices during their ownership. This finding leads 
to following propositions: 
Proposition 1: Considering established companies, successful PE investors add value 
by focusing on promoting entrepreneurial behaviour in the organization. 
Proposition 2: Considering entrepreneurial companies, successful PE investors add 
value by focusing on promoting professionalization of the organization. 
In addition, several interviewees mentioned that increased professionalization and 
ambitious and risky growth plans are somewhat contradictory objectives. According to 
interviewees, more systematized internal procedures can increase bureaucracy and 
decrease entrepreneurial spirit in the company. For example, the investment manager of 
case L shares the concern that while companies become more professionalized, they can 
lose the drive of a young venture: 
”It (professionalization of the company) has it good and bad sides. … Enthusiasm of a 
young company should be preserved in the company. We have discussed about this a 
lot. Because (the company) should not become too corporate either. The bad side of a 
corporation is that everybody expects that somebody else does everything or tells what 
you should do.” 
Also the investment partner of Case A acknowledges this tension between 
professionalization and entrepreneurial behaviour: 
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"When building a larger entity, one risk is that we will bring only bureaucracy and 
reporting. Although these kinds of things are necessary, they can also kill 
entrepreneurial attitude, hard-working atmosphere and growth-oriented culture " 
As can be seen in quotes above, interviewed investors acknowledge that there must be a 
balance between growth-promoting and institutionalizing activities. At best, private 
equity investors are able to develop their portfolio companies at a sustainable manner; 
promote growth while simultaneously professionalizing the organization. These 
findings provide us with the following propositions: 
Proposition 3: Successful PE investors are able to balance between promoting 
entrepreneurial behaviour and professionalization in their portfolio companies. 
4.1.3.2. Approach on strategic planning 
Based on cross-case analysis between buyout and venture capital cases, it seems that 
buyout and venture capital investors see the role of strategic planning somewhat 
differently (see Appendix C). As discussed in earlier chapters, buyout investors 
emphasized the role of predefined medium-term value-creation plans while venture 
capital investors typically described their role in strategic planning as participants in 
ongoing strategic discussion. Although these two approaches, proactive medium-term 
planning and continuing discussion are not exclusionary activities and both investor 
types are to some extent involved in both types of strategic planning, buyout and 
venture capital investors seem to place a different emphasis on these approaches. This 
finding leads to following propositions: 
Proposition 4: In buyout investments, the focus of strategic planning is on the 
development of a medium-term value creation plan. 
Proposition 5: In venture capital investments, the focus of strategic planning is on 
ongoing strategic discussion. 
In Chapter 4.2.2, I will develop these propositions further and argue that successful PE 
investors are able to adjust strategic plans during unexpected changes in the market. 
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4.1.3.3. Development of the top-management team 
In young and entrepreneurial companies, typically in Group 2 or 3, recruiting of outside 
management professionals can be considered one tool to professionalize the company. 
In contrast in established companies, typically Group 1 and Group 4, a new CEO was 
often recruited to revitalize the organization or to lead the company during significant 
strategic changes. Appendix D summarises reasons for recruiting a new CEO in those 
cases where a new CEO was recruited. In other words, reasons for recruiting a new 
CEO and other top-management team members is linked to the focus of investor 
involvement. The fit between the reason to recruit a new CEO and the current 
development stage of the portfolio company seems to determine whether this activity is 
value adding or not. This finding is presented below as two propositions: 
Proposition 6: Considering entrepreneurial companies, recruiting of a new CEO adds 
value when it is aimed at professionalizing the company. 
Proposition 7: Considering established companies, recruiting of a new CEO adds value 
when it is aimed at revitalizing the company. 
4.1.3.4. Reputation provided by PE investors 
As was discussed in Chapter 4.1.2.3, young ventures often lack legitimacy or credibility 
in the eyes of external stakeholders. Both interviewed investors and CEOs 
acknowledged that the VC investor has a role as a provider of reputation for the 
portfolio company (see Appendix E). This credibility may be needed in order to 
convince, for example, new customers or debt providers about the quality of the start-
up. However, this phenomenon was not present in buyout cases. Hence, the following 
proposition can be made. 
Proposition 8: Benefits from affiliating with a reputable PE investor are greater for VC 
backed rather than buyout backed companies. 
4.1.3.5. Limits of investor involvement 
As discussed earlier, the key value-adding services of PE investors include involvement 
in strategic planning, recruiting of the key management and monitoring, changes in 
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corporate governance and sparring of the management team. These are activities in 
which all interviewed investment managers participate. Although these activities can 
potentially have a significant effect on the company performance, it should be 
highlighted that PE investors do not and should not run the actual business. The line 
between planning and implementation also seems to define the boundaries of investor 
involvement. 
In general, interviewed investment managers have, besides private equity, prior work 
experience either in finance or management consulting. For this reason, their fields of 
expertise are typically related to finance and/or strategy. Hence, it is natural that 
investment managers are mainly involved in these aspects of the business. Both 
interviewed investment managers and CEOs agree that PE investors typically do not 
and should not participate in the day-to-day, operational decision-making and 
management in their portfolio companies. In addition to the lack of operational 
expertise, investment managers highlight the importance to separate roles of the 
external investor/ board member and the operational management. This point is related 
to earlier-discussed changes in corporate governance in which PE investors typically 
have an active role. The investment partner of Case A summarises why the PE investor 
was not involved in the operational aspects of the business as follows: 
 “I would say that right after we had recruited the management team, we withdrew from 
that role (in operational management) because it is not a part of our job description 
and it is not sensible to allocate time for that. Moreover, we are not even good at it and 
it is pointless to do something at which you are not good and which is not your 
business.” 
Furthermore, the investment partner of case L summarises where he thinks is the limit 
of the investor involvement in the following way: 
 “As long as it (investor’s involvement in operational aspects) is sparring, everything is 
fine. But if you really have to start doing things as a member of the board or as an 
investor yourself, then you have either a wrong management team or wrong people in 
that team. I think that, as a board member and as an investor, you are like the owner or 
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the general manager or the coach of the hockey or football team. If you have to go there 
and start to play the game yourself, it will come to nothing.” 
Considering the limits of investor involvement, exceptions seem to be those investment 
managers who have prior business experience that is directly related to the industry in 
which the portfolio company operates. Not even these investors are involved in the 
operational day-to-day business management but they may provide advice or relevant 
industry contacts in case of operational issues. For example, investment managers of 
case J are both investors and founders of the case company and former colleagues of 
several members of the management team. They have 10-15 years experience from the 
industry and hence are able to provide relevant contacts not only in the financial sector 
but also in the industry: 
 “When the organisation faces some challenges they may ask us ‘hey, who could help us 
and who knows something’. … That, quite logically, is related to our long industry 
experience.” 
In conclusion, investment managers of case companies are mainly involved in those 
areas of the company development about which they have prior experience and 
expertise. Involvement in areas about which the PE investor does not have expertise 
was considered even harmful for the portfolio company. These findings lead to the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 9: Successful PE investors actively participate in only those aspects of the 
portfolio company business of which they have relevant expertise. 
In Chapter 4.2.1, I will complement this proposition and argue that successful PE 
investors are able to identify their own areas of expertise and acquire further 
complementary expertise for their portfolio companies. 
4.2. Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis on the effects of investor 
characteristics and environmental conditions  
This chapter presents the results of two fsQCA analyses. The first analysis examines 
how prior experience and further accumulated expertise of the PE investor, and 
complementary expertise of outside board members affect portfolio company 
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performance. The main result of the analysis is that an ability to build a balanced 
portfolio of diverse types of expertise in the board of directors has a positive effect on 
portfolio company performance. On the other hand, the latter analysis studies the effect 
of industry dynamism and an ability to adjust strategy according to environmental 
changes on portfolio company performance. The key finding of this analysis is that 
during unpredictable changes a successful PE backed company should be able to make 
also those type for strategic decisions that are contradictory to the original value 
creation plan. In conclusion, both analyses emphasize the importance of adaptive 
investor involvement – one from the perspective of investor characteristics and another 
from the perspective of industry dynamism. 
4.2.1. Experience of the PE investor and outside expertise 
acquired through networks 
One interview question was what resources the PE investor has brought to the portfolio 
company. Almost all interviewed investment managers mentioned their expertise as one 
key resource. Expertise was further acquired through business and investor experience. 
The role of experience is also widely present in the existing academic literature (see e.g. 
Kaplan & Schoar 2003; Bottazzi et al. 2008). Based on interviews, expertise of the 
investor is transferred to the portfolio company through informal sparring and advice as 
well as through involvement in formal board and strategy work. 
However, interviewed investors come from various backgrounds and differ in terms of 
prior experience. Thus, they differ also in terms of their expertise profiles. In addition, 
both interviewed investors and CEOs stated that the PE investor does not naturally have 
experience in all fields that are possibly relevant for the portfolio company. Typically, 
investors have experience related to financial and strategic issues, but they are less 
familiar with operational aspects of the business. Hence in almost all cases, the investor 
has appointed outside board members with relevant business experience. In all cases, at 
least one outside board member has prior operational experience from the same or 
closely related industry in which the case company operates. This means that besides 
monitoring and approval of long-term strategic decisions, the board of directors has a 
role also as a provider of valuable business expertise. These findings evoke two 
questions. Is a certain type of investor experience associated with positive performance, 
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and can the expertise of the PE investor be complemented by the expertise of outside 
board members? 
In order to examine these questions in more detail, a fsQCA algorithm with four causal 
conditions was conducted. The first condition is years of work experience in private 
equity that the investment manager(s) of the case company had at the time of the first 
investment. This was considered an important condition because several activities that 
PE investors perform in their portfolio companies, such as strategic positioning and help 
the company obtain additional funding, are present in basically all PE cases, Hence, 
experience from former portfolio companies may provide the investment manager with 
valuable expertise. Considering this dimension, PE experience of 10 years or more 
received a full membership score while PE experience of 2 years or less were non-
members of this condition. A membership score of 50 % was set to 6 years in private 
equity. 
In addition to experience in private equity, other business experience is an interesting 
condition that may have a positive effect on intangible resources that the PE investor 
can offer her/his portfolio companies. This second dimension does not differentiate 
operational experience from, for example, experience from management consulting or 
financial advisory. In addition, other business experience of the investment manager can 
be from any industry except private equity. Hence, this dimension measures the general 
business and corporate-related experience of the investor rather than her/his specific 
industry knowledge. This dimension was calibrated similarly than the first one. 
The third causal condition is prior industry experience. The investment manager can 
have prior experience, either as an investor or as a business manager, from the industry 
of the portfolio company.  It is a reasonable assumption that prior experience from a 
relevant field would accumulate intangible resources of the investor in a meaningful 
way. However, prior industry experience is present in only 2 cases, G and J. Hence, 
although interviewed investment managers of cases G and J both considered prior 
industry experience beneficial, it can not be logically considered to be a necessary 
condition for good portfolio company performance. In this analysis, prior industry 
experience is a binary variable. 
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In order to simplify the analysis, only the experience of those investment managers, 
who were also board members in the case company, were analysed. If there were two 
managers in this position, the one that had more experience was included in the 
analysis. This means that the experience of those investment managers who were 
actively involved in the case but did not act as board members or are younger than their 
colleagues are excluded from the analysis.  
The fourth and final condition is the share of outside board members in the portfolio 
company. Several interviewees mentioned that outside board members provide the 
company with valuable business expertise. In addition, PE investors also mentioned that 
when hiring outside board members, their primary objective is to find business 
professionals with relevant expertise that the company currently lacks or especially 
needs. Thus, it can be concluded that outside board members complement the portfolio 
of intangible resources that PE investors offer their portfolio companies. The full 
membership score was set to 60 %, 50% membership score to 40%, and 20% or less 
received a membership score of zero. 
Finally, the outcome of these four conditions is 3-year compounded sales growth of the 
case company since the first investment. The case was considered to be a full member 
of the outcome if 3-year sales CAGR was 60% or more. Similarly, the case was 
considered to be a non-member of the outcome if the 3-year sales CAGR was 20% or 
less. The point for 50% membership was set to 40%. Table 11 summarises calibration 
limits of conditions and the outcome. 
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Table 11. 0%, 50% and 100% membership score limits for causal conditions and the 
outcome. 
  
 
The results of the fsQCA algorithm are presented in Table 12. The table shows that 
there are three different configurations that can lead to positive portfolio company 
performance.  
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Table 12. Solution table of the fsQCA analysis. 
  
The first solution implies that if the investment manager herself/himself has only 
limited amount of prior business experience, strong presence of outside board members 
has a positive effect on portfolio company performance. In this solution, the experience 
in private equity is not a relevant causal condition. Reason for this is that configurations 
that belong to this group contain cases with both long and relatively short PE experience 
at the time of the first investment. This does not, however, mean that prior PE 
experience could not be a beneficial characteristic for an investor. 
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On the other hand, as implied by the second solution the presence of outside board 
members is not needed if the investment manager has prior experience from the same 
industry in which the portfolio company operates. This solution covers two 
configurations, namely G and J. In case G, the investment manager has previously been 
a case manager in a portfolio company that operated in the same industry as the case 
company G. In other words, the investment manager has prior PE experience from the 
relevant industry. On the other hand in case J, both investment managers have 
previously been involved in a highly successful company that operated in the same 
industry as the case company J. One investment manager worked as a director in that 
company while the other was an individual investor and advisor for the same company. 
In conclusion, operational or PE experience from the relevant industry may decrease the 
need for additional business expertise provided by outside board members. 
Finally, the third solution indicates that strong business experience combined with long 
history in private equity can lead to positive portfolio company performance. In this 
configuration, prior business experience is not from the same industry in which the 
portfolio company operates. However, this does not mean that the investment manager 
could not have experience from closely related industries either as an operational 
manager or an investor. In these configurations, the expertise of the investor can be 
complemented by the expertise of outside board members or not.  
The key finding of this analysis is that each individual solution has different core 
conditions. In other words, there is no single type of experience that would ensure good 
outcome. In contrast, key to success seems to be the ability to identify what type of 
experience the investment team has and then complement this expertise portfolio with 
suitable profiles in the board of directors. These findings result to the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 10: Successful PE investors identify their own expertise profile and are 
able to provide complementary expertise through their networks. 
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4.2.2. Environmental dynamism and involvement in 
strategic planning 
Another theme that several interviewees mentioned is the impact of environmental 
factors on investor involvement, and more specifically the impact on involvement in 
strategic planning. As discussed in Chapter 4.1, buyout and venture capital investors 
have somewhat different approaches on strategic planning. Venture capital investors 
argued that rapidly changing environment requires strategic planning to be an ongoing 
dialogue between the PE investor and the top-management team. On the other hand, 
buyout investors stated that based on their views on the future of the industry, they 
created a vision and growth plan in the beginning of the project together with the 
management. Appendix C summarises each PE investor’s approach on strategic 
planning. 
Naturally, both of these approaches can lead to a good outcome. However, the main 
assumption in the medium-term value creation plan approach is that the industry 
develops as expected. If this is not the case, the company has to be able to change its 
strategic direction substantially. Buyout case F provides an example of this 
phenomenon. Initially, the company operated in an attractive market with substantial 
growth potential. About a year after the initial investment, the market crashed 
unexpectedly due to a political dispute. The top-management team and the investor 
started to think what other services the company could offer for its target customers and 
with the existing business concept that was developed in the beginning of the 
investment period. With the support of the VC investor, the company initiated a 
substantial strategic transformation, and was able to grow from scratch to a fast-growing 
company with yearly revenue of over 20 million euros. Although in terms of sales 
growth case F is not among the top-performing cases, the case can be considered a 
successful example on how ability to promote strategic change during radical and 
unexpected changes is a valuable form of active ownership. 
On the other hand, case C, which is the largest one of case companies in terms of pre-
investment revenue, operates in a fairly mature and stable industry, which, however, is 
highly vulnerable to macro-economic changes. The market crashed during the financial 
crisis in 2009 and consequently, company sales decreased by 50%. The company did 
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not change its strategic direction fundamentally in order to recover from or prepare for 
the crisis. The interviewed investment manager mentioned that although the company 
was prepared for worsening economic conditions, the magnitude of the market drop 
surprised them. Although it is impossible to say whether the company would have been 
immune to worsening industry conditions if it had adjusted its strategy, Case C is an 
example of a company in which pre-defined value creation plan was affected by 
unexpected market changes. 
In conclusion, environmental dynamism and ability to adapt to industry changes seems 
to be an important factor affecting the value-adding potential of private equity. To 
examine this effect, a simple fsQCA algorithm across three dimensions was performed. 
Considering environment dynamism, two dimensions presented in the existing literature 
were taken into account. First of them is the rate of industry change while the second 
one is the uncertainty of the market (Fiss et al. 2011; Baum & Wally 2003; Dess & 
Beard 1984). These dimensions were measured by sending all interviewees a short 
survey in which they rated both rate of change and uncertainty of the market in a scale 
of 1 to 5.  Considering both dimensions, the case was considered to be a full member of 
the condition if the perceived rate of change/ uncertainty was considered very high (5). 
Similarly, the case was considered to be a non-member of the condition if the perceived 
rate of change/ uncertainty was very low (1). The point for 50% membership was set to 
3. 
In addition, cases were divided into two groups in terms of strategic change; those in 
which strategic direction has not substantially changed during the PE fund’s ownership 
and those in which the investor and the top-management team have decided to refocus 
the strategy. Based on interviews, these adjustments in case company strategy were 
mainly initiated due to changes in the industry landscape. Appendix F summarises 
cases in which strategic has been refocused during PE fund’s ownership. Like in 
Chapter 4.2.1, performance was measured as 3-year revenue CAGR since the first 
investment. Table 13 shows how these three dimensions and the outcome variable were 
calibrated. The fsQCA algorithm produced two distinct solutions. These are presented 
in Table 14.  
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Table 13. 0%, 50% and 100% membership score limits for causal conditions and the 
outcome. 
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Table 14. Solution table of the fsQCA algorithm. 
 
 
Table 14 shows that key differentiating factors between two solutions are environmental 
uncertainty and existence of strategic changes. In the first solution, industry changes are 
somewhat predictable and probably due to that, no major strategic changes are needed. 
In this solution, the rate of environmental change can be either rapid or slow. The 
solution covers both buyout and venture capital cases. In other words, both medium-
term value creation plan and ongoing strategic discussion can be suitable approaches on 
strategic planning in this type of environment. On the other hand, the second solution 
states that a good outcome can be achieved also in unpredictably and rapidly changing 
environments if the company is able to adjust its strategic direction accordingly. As case 
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F shows, the PE investor can have a significant role in this strategic refocusing. Results 
of this analysis lead to following propositions: 
Proposition 11: When the industry changes as expected, successful PE investors 
promote the implementation of the original strategic vision. 
Proposition 12: When industry changes are unexpected, successful PE investors adjust 
the original value creation plan. 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
This final chapter discusses results and compares them with findings presented in the 
academic literature. In addition, reliability and validity of results will be assessed.  
Finally, this chapter suggests some directions for further research.  
5.1. Discussion of results 
The purpose of this thesis was to examine how Finnish PE investors contribute to the 
performance of their portfolio companies. Considering the empirical part of the thesis, 
the research problem was divided into three research questions. First, this thesis studied 
how Finnish PE investors use value-adding mechanisms in order to facilitate the growth 
of their portfolio companies. Another perspective, which was discussed in Chapter 
4.2.1, was to examine whether investor-specific characteristics affect value added by 
Finnish PE investors. Finally in Chapter 4.2.2, effects of industry characteristics on 
value added by Finnish PE investors were studied. During the next sub-chapters, I will 
discuss results of each of these research questions in more detail. 
In order to discuss results in a clear and concise manner, earlier provided propositions 
are divided into three categories, which will be discussed separately during the next 
paragraphs. The first category consists of propositions 1-7, which are related to non-
financial services provided by PE investors. This group of propositions is related to the 
first-mentioned research question “How have private equity investors used value-
adding mechanisms in order to contribute to the operational performance of their 
Finnish portfolio companies?”. In addition, propositions 8, 9 and 10 form the second 
group of propositions, which focuses on investor characteristics. This groups provides 
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answers for the research question “How do investor characteristics affect value added 
by private equity?”. Finally, the third group of propositions includes propositions 11 
and 12 and this group is related to the research question “What is the role of industry 
characteristics on value added by private equity?”. Table 15 summarises proposition 
groups. 
Table 15. Proposition groups. 
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Considering the question “How have private equity investors used value-adding 
mechanisms in order to contribute to the operational performance of their Finnish 
portfolio companies?, propositions 1,2,6 and 7 imply that the development stage of the 
portfolio company affects value-adding mechanisms of private equity. For 
entrepreneurial companies, one key value-adding mechanism of private equity is 
increased professionalism through development of company structures and the top-
management team. This finding is consistent with and complements findings of 
Hellmann & Puri (2002); besides venture capital investors, also buyout investors have a 
role as promoters of professionalization when the portfolio company is at a phase of fast 
growth that, in order to be sustainable, requires the development of company processes 
and structures.  
On the other hand for more established PE backed companies, a significant component 
of value added comes from increased ambition level and justified yet controlled risk-
taking. This finding was found to be relevant for both buyout- and VC backed 
companies. Considering the existing academic research, this result is somewhat 
contradictory to the traditional view that sees buyouts as promoters of efficiency 
(Jensen 1989). However contrary to that belief, several studies have argued that buyout 
investors have also role as promoters for opportunity-seeking behaviour (Bruining & 
Wright 2002; Bruining et al. 2013; Wright et al. 2000; Wright et al. 2001). Findings of 
this study suggest that in several cases, value added of private equity comes from 
increased entrepreneurial behaviour and that improved efficiency is rather a necessary 
condition that facilitates pursued fast growth than a central value-adding mechanism.  
Proposition 3 provides one final insight considering the above-presented research 
question. According to that proposition, PE investors contribute to the performance of 
their portfolio companies by continuously pursuing balance between promoting of 
opportunity-seeking actions and professionalization measures. This means that although 
investors typically focus on promoting either entrepreneurial behaviour or 
professionalization, they should ensure that the company sustains also a sufficient level 
of the other component. This way, PE investors are able to sustainably help their 
portfolio companies enter the next stage of development. As discussed in Chapter 4.1 if 
the PE investor during the first years of investment focuses, for example, on 
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professionalizing the company, it should be ensured that the company sustains 
entrepreneurial spirit in order to grow also in the future. Findings of Bruining et al. 
(2013) are in line with the result provided by Proposition 3. Bruining et al. (2013) 
argues that PE investors help their portfolio companies to become ambidextrous i.e. 
able to maintain and develop both entrepreneurial and administrative management 
practices. Results of this study extend this finding by presenting that same perspective is 
relevant also in the case of VC backed companies.  
Looking results from the perspective of investor characteristics, propositions 9 and 10 
indicate that experience of the investor and ‘external’ expertise acquired through 
investor networks complement each other. Considering the research question “How do 
investor characteristics affect value added by  private equity?”, this finding implies that 
not only PE investor’s own experience and related expertise but also her/his ability to 
acquire complementary expertise through networks affect value added of private equity. 
Considering the existing academic research, findings of this study complement the 
perspective that investor experience or some other investor characteristic itself would 
have a positive effect on portfolio company performance (e.g. Kaplan & Schoar 2005; 
Sorensen 2007). Investor experience indeed may be beneficial for the portfolio 
company but it is not a necessary condition for portfolio company success. Instead, 
ability to offer a balanced portfolio of expertise seems to be a unifying factor across 
successful cases.  
The key implication of propositions 4,5, 11 and 12 i.e. results discussing the effect of 
industry dynamism and investor type on investor involvement in strategic planning is 
the importance of adaptive approach. On one hand, a pre-defined strategic vision seems 
to be a highly effective value-creation tool in several buyout cases (see e.g. cases A, D 
and E). On the other hand, during unpredictable times, also those investors that focus on 
more established and stable companies should be able to adjust the strategy of the 
portfolio company according to new industry fundamentals.  
In the academic context, predefined strategic planning and ongoing strategic dialogue 
are to some degree analogous to emerging and deliberate strategies (Mintzberg & 
Waters 1985). The debate between the usefulness of deliberate and emerging strategies 
is an extensively discussed topic in the strategic management literature (see e.g. Porter 
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1996 vs. Mintzberg 1987). However, involvement in strategic planning is yet a 
relatively unstudied topic in the private equity literature. Findings of this study imply 
that due to the different investment focuses and risk profiles, buyout investors and VC 
investors may benefit from different types of approaches on strategic planning. 
However, ultimately, all PE investors should aim at balancing between forward-looking 
strategic planning and corrective adjustments when participating in strategic planning in 
their portfolio companies. 
In conclusion, a good PE investor first and foremost adjusts the extent and nature of 
her/his involvement depending on development stage of the portfolio company, industry 
dynamics and her/his own expertise. PE investors are able to help their portfolio 
companies prosper by promoting right type of management practices and providing 
support through their own expertise and networks of external experts. Results of this 
study imply that in the Finnish context, PE investors are an important form of 
ownership that is both active and professional and hence facilitates fast and sustainable 
growth of Finnish companies. 
5.2. Reliability and validity 
This chapter analyses quality of results and limitations of this study in terms of four 
concepts; construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. Construct 
validity refers to the question whether acquired data appropriately describes the studied 
phenomenon. Internal validity refers to credibility of causal arguments while external 
validity can be considered generalizability of results. Finally, a case study is reliable if it 
can be repeated with the same results by also other researchers. (Yin 1994; Gibbert et al. 
2008) 
In this study, the key concern related to the quality of results is construct validity – does 
the study examine what it claims to be examining. The main threat to construct validity 
is the potential subjectivity of results. There are three ways to overcome this threat; use 
of multiple data sources (Gibbert & Ruigrok 2010; Denzin & Lincoln 1994), 
establishing of a clear chain of evidence and let key informants to review the report 
before publishing results (Yin 1994). Considering two latter-mentioned ways, this study 
can be considered relatively valid; research questions led data collection phase, all data 
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was documented and collected into one database, results are based on collected data, 
and key interviewees read and approved main results of the study.  
Considering the number and variety of data sources, construct validity evokes some 
concerns. On one hand, interviewees of this study include both representatives of PE 
companies and CEOs of PE backed companies. However, a larger number of 
interviewed CEOs and interviews with, for example, potential foreign investors of case 
companies would improve construct validity of this study. The combination of different 
perspectives would allow a more rigorous comparison between non-financial services 
that PE investors claim to be providing and non-financial services that 
entrepreneurs/managers actually consider value adding. 
Considering the fsQCA analysis on the effect of investor experience on portfolio 
company performance, the degree of construct validity should also be assessed. In this 
analysis, the amount of experience is used as a proxy for cumulated business, industry 
or PE expertise. In order to further improve the construct validity of this analysis, CEOs 
and other key employees of case companies could be asked to assess the perceived 
amount and areas of investor expertise. 
In terms of internal validity, the main concern is whether there are alternative 
explanations for the studied phenomenon (Yin 1994) i.e. whether some other PE-
investor-related factors than those identified in propositions that contribute to portfolio 
company performance. In order to tackle this concern, patterns emerging from the data 
were constantly compared with findings of the existing literature (Eisenhardt 1989). For 
example, existing academic literature has identified the effect of buyout investment on 
increased entrepreneurial orientation (see e.g. Wright et al. 2000) as well as effect of 
venture capital funding on portfolio company professionalization (Hellmann & Puri 
2002). Also the effect of prior experience of the PE investor on portfolio company 
performance is identified also in the earlier academic studies (see e.g. Bottazzi et al. 
2008). As a consequence, obtained results take multiple perspectives into account and 
complement existing academic findings.  
The main threat for internal validity in this study is the appropriateness of the sample. 
As the number of cases with negative growth in the sample is relatively small, it is 
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possible that this study fails at capturing those factors that are unique only to successful 
cases. Hence, in order to increase the internal validity of this study, the most critical 
next steps would be to include more cases with negative post-investment performance 
in the sample and to re-conduct the cross-case analyses with this more balanced sample.  
Furthermore, it should be acknowledged that internal validity evokes some concerns 
considering results discussing which characteristics are valuable for PE investors; 
importance of investor networks (see e.g. Hochberg et al. 2007) is probably 
underestimated in this study. This limitation is mainly related to the research design; 
Interviewees were asked also to describe their networks and impact of those networks 
but as individual’s own perceptions on her/his networks are probably somewhat 
subjective, findings related to networks were not considered valid enough to be included 
in this study. 
Considering external validity, a multiple case design combined with configurational 
approach and the use of replication logic, i.e. treatment of cases as distinct experiments, 
ensure that results of this study can be analytically generalized in the Finnish context. 
At this point, a distinction should be made between analytical i.e. theoretical and 
statistical generalizability; the chosen research design is suitable for theory-building 
rather than theory-testing purposes (Eisenhardt 1989). A quantitative, theory-testing 
approach would be required in order to establish statistical generalizability of results. 
However, as indicated by the research question and design, theory testing is not the 
objective of this study, and hence a more quantitative approach and, for example, 
further developed fsQCA analyses with larger sample are rather suggestions for further 
research than limitations of this study. Similarly, as the study focuses on the Finnish PE 
sector, the fact that results of this study are context-dependent and can not be applied to 
other geographical regions provides avenues for further research rather than reduces the 
quality of results.  
Finally, reliability of results does not significantly limit quality of the results. First, 
Chapters 3 and 4 provide a case study protocol (Yin 1994) i.e. these chapters explain 
which methods, techniques and assumptions have been used to obtain results of this 
study. Second, all key data used in this study including the most important quotes, case 
descriptions and interview templates are presented in the report and its appendices. In 
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addition, these documents combined with transcribed interview data and interview notes 
are collected in one database (in this case in an ATLAS.ti hermeneutic unit) as 
suggested by Yin (1994). In summary, results of this study can be considered reliable 
and valid in the context of Finnish PE sector.  
5.3. Directions for further research 
This study provides a comprehensive overview on the value-adding mechanisms of the 
Finnish private equity sector. Results of the study indicate that in the Finnish context, 
PE investors facilitate fast and sustainable company growth by i) promoting risk-taking 
when it is justified and controllable and ii) providing risk-mitigating non-financial 
services during phases of fast growth. This finding is not novel itself (see e.g. Carpenter 
et al. 2003; Bruining et al. 2013) but it highlights the need for acknowledging PE 
investing as an important form of active and professional ownership. In further studies, 
propositions of this study could be further developed into hypotheses and tested in order 
to see whether same results apply across larger populations. For example, fsQCA 
analysis on the effect of investor background and support provided by external board 
members would be interesting to conduct with larger sample size.  
Furthermore, a 25-year-old Finnish PE industry is still relatively young, and it is likely 
that investors in more mature or larger PE markets differ in terms of value-adding 
mechanisms. A cross-country comparison between the Finnish and, for example, the US 
PE sector would provide deeper understanding on how the size and maturity of the PE 
sector affect non-financial services provided by PE investors. An interesting question 
would be, for example, whether Finnish and US-based PE investors differ in terms of 
risk preferences and ability to promote entrepreneurial behaviour and 
professionalization in their portfolio companies.    
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